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RECENT CASES
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS - CIVIL CONTEMPT - IN-
CARCERATION OF NEWSPERSON FOR REFUSAL TO
DISCLOSE CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES DOES NOT
ABRIDGE FIRST AMENDMENT -Farr v. Pitchess, 522
F.2d 464 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3162
(Sept. 22, 1975).
When newsperson William Farr refused to disclose to a Los
Angeles trial judge the identity of persons who had supplied
him with information about a pending murder trial in direct
violation of a court order, he was jailed for contempt. Publicity
and legal commentary generated by Farr's subsequent efforts
to overturn the contempt conviction have made his one of the
most celebrated "free press v. fair trial"' cases in the wake of
Branzburg v. Hayes,2 the seminal United States Supreme
1. "Free press v. fair trial" is here used as an expression signifying tension be-
tween the first amendment right of a newsperson to cover and publish reports of
criminal investigations and criminal judicial proceedings, and the sixth amendment
right of a defendant to stand trial before jurors free of bias. The tension is greatest when
defendants or victims are public figures, or when the nature of the alleged crime
arouses public interest. See United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 502-06 (5th Cir.
1972) (summary of historical clash between first and sixth amendments); A. FRIENDLY
& R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY (1967); J. LOFTON, JUSTICE AND THE PRESS (1966).
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg is a consolidation of three cases: Branzburg
v. Hayes, In re Pappas, add United States v. Caldwell. Each case involved newspersons
who were subpoenaed to testify before grand juries regarding sources and content of
information received in confidence in their capacities as journalists.
Paul Branzburg was a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal who infiltrated
the marihuana-hashish processing and distribution systems in Louisville and Frank-
fort, Kentucky, promising confidentiality to interviewees. He refused to disclose to
state grand juries either the names of persons he interviewed, or any other information
he had acquired while researching his stories. Id. at 667-71.
Paul Pappas was a television newsperson who was allowed entry to a New Bedford,
Massachusetts, headquarters of the Black Panther Party during civil disturbances.
Because of his promises of confidentiality to Party members, Pappas refused to dis-
close to a state grand jury whom he had seen or what he had heard while in the
headquarters. Id. at 672-75. Both Branzburg and Pappas refused to reveal their sources
because they feared that to do so would destroy their credibility with future inform-
ants.
Earl Caldwell was a New York Times reporter who gained the trust of the Oak-
land, California, Black Panther Party. When subpoenaed to testify about his knowl-
edge of the party organization, Caldwell refused to appear before the San Francisco
federal grand jury. Caldwell felt that such an appearance, because of the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings, might jeopardize his future relationship with Party members,
and thus diminish his effectiveness as a journalist. Id. at 675-79.
For a discussion of the decision of the Branzburg trilogy, see text accompanying
notes 24-35 infra.
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Court decision dealing with the testimonial privilege of journal-
ists. Confronted with an appeal from a district court's denial
of a writ of habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reduced numerous issues in the case of
Farr v. Pitchess3 to a simply stated question: when a newsper-
son's first amendment rights conflict with a court's duty to
conduct a fair trial, which interest prevails?' The court found
the latter duty paramount, and found Farr's contempt incar-
ceration free from constitutional defect.'
The Farr case arose out of the famous "Manson Family"
murder trial in 1970-71. Charles Manson and his co-defendants
were arrested and indicted in Los Angeles on multiple counts
of first degree murder. The ghoulishness of the so-called Tate-
LaBianca murders and exhibitions of bizarre behavior by the
defendants attracted intense media interest to the attending
police investigation and subsequent court proceedings.' In ac-
cord with the duty to protect the right of the defendants to fair
trials, the superior court issued an "Order re Publicity" which
prohibited any attorney, court attach6, or prospective witness
from releasing to the press the contents or description of either
proposed trial testimony or other possible evidence.7
William Farr, then a reporter for .the Los Angeles Herald
Examiner, was one of scores of journalists assigned to the Tate-
LaBianca murder investigations and "Manson Family" trial.
During his reportorial investigation, Farr obtained copies of a
prospective witness's statement concerning one of the defen-
dants which had been elicited by a deputy, district attorney.'
3. 522 F.2d 464, 467 n.1 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S.
Sept. 22, 1975) (No. 75-444). The court summarily dismissed Farr's contentions: that
the trial judge was biased; that the trial judge had misled and misinformed him as to
the effect of California's shield law (see note 13 infra); and that running of the statute
of limitations precluded prosecution for contempt, and ought to relieve him of the need
to purge himself of contempt.
4. Id. at 468.
5. Id. at 469.
6. V. BUGLIOSI & C. GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER (1974).
7. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 64, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344; cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
8. A deputy district attorney assigned to the Manson prosecution interviewed
and obtained a statement from Virginia Graham, a former associate of the defendants
and, as such, a prospective witness. In her statement, Ms. Graham alleged that defen-
dant Susan Atkins had privately confessed complicity in the murders. Atkins also
implicated Charles Manson in the crimes, and revealed to Graham plans for the
murders of prominent entertainment personalities. The names of Elizabeth Taylor,
Richard Burton, Frank-Sinatra, Tom Jones, and Steve McQueen were offered as pro-
posed victims. The statement was the basis for an exclusive and sensational story by
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Release to a reporter of such information was incontestably in
violation of the trial court's order.' Before publication of Farr's
story based on the witness's statement, the trial judge learned
of the violation and sought from Farr the identities of the in-
formants. Farr refused to reveal his sources, and the next day's
Herald Examiner carried his sensational by-lined story based
on the witness's statement."
Following the Manson trial, the court again ordered Farr
to disclose his sources." Farr revealed only that he had ob-
tained separate copies of the statement from three persons, at
least two of whom were subject to the "Order re Publicity." He
had promised each source confidentiality. 2 After rejecting
Farr's contention that the state's shield law 3 and the first
amendment immunized him from forced disclosure, the court
held Farr in contempt and ordered him incarcerated until he
complied with the order to disclose. 4
The trial court's order was affirmed by the state court of
Farr. When Ms. Graham testified at the Manson trial, after the story was published,
most of her allegations were not admitted into evidence. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 60, 65, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344; cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
9. Farr admitted being aware of the "Order re Publicity," and conceded that, to
his knowledge, each of the sources was also aware of the order. Farr v. Pitchess, 522
F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 64, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 344 (1972).
10. Farr's story was carried under a banner headline, "Liz, Sinatra on Slay
List-Tate Witness," in the Oct. 9, 1970 Los Angeles Herald Examiner. The jury had
already been sequestered, and thus never read the story. Farr v. Superior Court, 22
Cal. App. 3d 60, 65, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 (1972).
11. The trial court, with a different judge presiding, conducted a hearing to
determine the source of the violation for purposes of supplementing the Manson record
on appeal with specific reference to the impact of publicity on the trial. The court also
sought testimony relating to possible participation of court officers and attaches in the
violation. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 65, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
12. At the hearing, Farr stated that the order had been violated by two attorneys
of record, and by one other person whose status as an attorney of record was neither
confirmed nor denied. Id. at 66, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
13. "Shield law" is the designation for CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp.
1975). At the time of Farr's refusal to disclose his sources of information, the shield
law stated:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed
upon a newspaper, or by a press association or wire service, cannot be
adjudged in contempt by a court . . . for refusing to disclose the source
of any information procured for publication and published in a newspa-
per.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966). For subsequent amendments, see note 58 infra.
14. The court stayed its order to permit Farr to pursue a writ of review. Farr v.
Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 65, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1011 (1972).
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appeal on writ of review. 5 The California Supreme Court de-
nied Farr's petition for a hearing," and the United States Su-
preme Court refused certiorari. 7 Farr was then afforded an-
other opportunity to purge himself of the contempt; he again
refused to betray his sources, and the superior court ordered
execution of its prior contempt judgment.'8 Farr initiated ha-
beas corpus proceedings in federal district court, but the writ
was denied." After an appeal was filed with the Ninth Circuit,
Justice Douglas, acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice, or-
dered Farr's release from custody pending the instant deci-
sion .20
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found in the Farr facts
a clear instance of the first amendment colliding with the sixth
amendment.2' The metaphor the court chose, a head-on colli-
sion of constitutional interests, cleared the way for a straight-
forward analysis of basic constitutional issues and permitted
the court to sidestep the myriad complexities which have
clouded attempted resolutions of the "free press v. fair trial"
conflict in other circuits. 22 The qualified testimonial privilege
afforded newspersons in Branzburg, the court concluded, must
give way to a trial judge's obligation, mandated by Sheppard
v. Maxwell,2" to protect the accused from prejudicial publicity.
On its face, the Parr decision appears to resolve unequivocally
the conflict between pressroom and courtroom in regard to po-
tentially prejudicial publicity. The terseness of the opinion,
however, may be deceptive; there is indication that the Court
of Appeals has left room for a broad testimonial privilege, one
affording more protection to journalists than the privilege rec-
15. Id. at 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
16. Id.
17. Farr v. Superior Court, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
18. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 581, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649, 651 (1974).
19. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.); petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3162 (Sept. 22, 1975) (No. 75-444).
20. Farr v. Pitchess, 409 U.S. 1243 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1973). After Justice
Douglas' action, the California Court of Appeal ordered a superior court hearing to
determine whether continued incarceration of Farr would accomplish the purpose of
the order. After such a hearing was held, the Los Angeles Superior Court ordered Farr's
permanent release from jail because there was no likelihood that Farr would comply
with the order.
21. 522 F.2d at 468.
22. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975); Comment, Newsmen's Privilege Two Years
After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amendment in Jeopardy, 49 TULANE L. REV. 417
(1975).
23. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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ognized in other circuits. This interpretation is suggested by
the curiously oblique manner in which the Farr court dealt with
Branzburg.
In Branzburg v. Hayes, the United States Supreme Court
confronted the question of whether the first amendment af-
forded reporters a conditional privilege against being com-
pelled to testify before grand juries with respect to information
received in confidence.24 While acknowledging first amendment
protection of newsgathering and publishing," the Court found
no constitutional grounds to support a newsperson's refusal to
disclose to grand juries both the content and source of confi-
dential information." Speaking for a plurality of four, Justice
White held that newspersons were "not exempt from the nor-
mal duty of appearing before a grand jury and answering ques-
tions relevant to a criminal investigation."2 The Court unequi-
vocally rejected the argument that as a precondition to forced
disclosure, the government should be required to show a com-
pelling interest in obtaining the information." The Supreme
Court plurality stressed that persons appearing before a grand
jury are not without recognized constitutional rights, but re-
fused to extend any special constitutional shield to journal-
ists. 9
In a concurring opinion which created a majority, Justice
Powell emphasized that even absent an express first amend-
ment privilege, newspersons are protected from indiscriminate
interrogation by investigatory bodies.30 Justice Powell ap-
peared willing to recognize a qualified testimonial privilege,
but it is not clear the interest he sketched is of constitutional
dimension. While the Powell opinion neither described the pre-
cise parameters of this not-quite-constitutional privilege, nor
offered a firm test, Powell seemed to suggest that such a privi-
lege should be recognized if a grand jury investigation were not
being conducted in good faith, if requested information were
only remotely related to the investigation, or if there were no
24. The question of whether a newsperson has a testimonial privilege not to
disclose confidential sources had not been argued before the Court. Garland v. Torre,
259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore.
244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
25. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
26. Id. at 689-90.
27. Id. at 685.
28. Id. at 701-02.
29. Id. at 707-08.
30. Id. at 709.
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legitimate need of law enforcement requiring revelation of the
confidential information or source." Whether a newsperson's
motion to quash a subpoena should be granted and a protective
order issued would be decided by "striking . . . a proper bal-
ance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all
citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal
conduct."3
Three dissenting Justices argued for a conditional privilege
based squarely on the first amendment.33 As a precondition to
compelling testimony from newspersons, Justice Stewart
argued, the government ought to be required to demonstrate
(1) that there is probable cause to believe the newsperson pos-
sesses information clearly relevant to specific probable viola-
tions of the law; (2) that there are no alternative means of
obtaining the information less destructive of first amendment
liberties; and (3) that there exists a compelling state interest
in the information itself. 4 Justice Douglas, who also found a
first amendment reporter's privilege, indicated in a separate
dissent that the immunity so conferred is unqualified and abso-
lute.35
Although Branzburg dealt specifically with testimony be-
fore a grand jury, the court of appeals held that its reasoning
'appears to teach broadly enough to be applied to other civil
31. Id. at 709-10.
32. Id. at 710.
33. Justice Stewart, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall, argued
that the plurality's view of the first amendment reflected "a disturbing insensitivity
to the critical role of an independent press in our society." Id. at 725. He further
emphasized that confidentiality is essential for many types of newsgathering, and
predicted that if newspersons were to be compelled to disclose confidential informa-
tion, sources would be deterred from giving information, reporters would be deterred
from publishing it, and uncertainty would lead to self-censorship. Id. at 730-31.
34. Id. at 743. The thrust of the Stewart test had been accepted by the Ninth
Circuit in Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970):
[W]e hold that where it has been shown that the public's First Amend-
ment right to be informed would be jeopardized by requiring a journalist
to submit to secret Grand Jury interrogation, the Government must re-
spond by demonstrating a compelling need for the witness's presence
before judicial process properly can issue to require attendance.
Id. at 1089.
The Caldwell court rejected, however, the reporter's formulation of a three-part
test similar to the one accepted by Stewart. Id. at 1089 n.10. Justice Stewart appar-
ently integrated the test rejected in Caldwell with a similar test proposed by the late
Professor Alexander Bickel, who represented the three largest television networks, the
New York Times, and other press interests as amicus curiae. Brief for Amici Curiae
at 29, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
35. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 711 (1972).
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or criminal judicial proceedings as well."36 This broad applica-
bility of the Branzburg rule to claims of testimonial privilege
in non-grand jury settings has escaped other circuits,37 and
Justice Douglas. 8
Curiously, while the court of appeals cited Branzburg as
clearly negating Farr's claim of first amendment privilege, the
court just as clearly rejected the United States Supreme
Court's plurality holding regarding the existence of the privi-
lege. The Supreme Court plurality declined to acknowledge
any constitutional testimonial privilege.39 The court of appeals,
however, apparently counted judges and included Powell
among the advocates of a constitutional privilege, for a total of
five; consequently, the court posited the existence of a "limited
or conditional"4 ° constitutional privilege, and proceeded to ex-
amine its scope in terms that echo, in part, both the Powell
concurrence and Stewart dissent in Branzburg.
Although the Powell concurrence is never cited, the Farr
court paraphrased the Justice's call for a balancing of press
interests against investigatory interests." Unlike Powell, how-
ever, the court clearly found the newsperson's testimonial priv-
36. 522 F.2d at 467.
37. Judicial interpretation of Branzburg has been inconsistent. Some courts have
limited the decision to its facts, requiring disclosure only in grand jury proceedings,
or where a compelling interest was clearly demonstrated. E.g., United States v. Dioni-
sio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Beverly v. United
States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972) (all holding that Branzburg applies only to grand
jury proceedings); Baker v. F & F Investment Co., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) (limited
to criminal proceedings); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972) (lim-
ited to instances where the government can demonstrate a compelling state interest
for disclosure); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973)
(limited to instances in which there are no alternative means for obtaining the informa-
tion).
Other courts have joined the Farr court in expanding the strict holding in
Branzburg to include other than grand jury settings. E.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d
631 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (extended application to civil actions); Smilow v. United States,
465 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1972) (Branzburg requirement to testify extended to persons other
than reporters); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972) (extended to
all criminal proceedings).
38. Farr v. Pitchess, 409 U.S. 1245-46 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1973).
39. See notes 26-29 supra.
40. 522 F.2d at 467.
41. Compare text accompanying note 32, supra with:
The application of the Branzburg holding . . . seems to require that the
claimed First Amendment privilege and the opposing need for disclosure
be judicially weighed in light of the surrounding facts and a balance
struck to determine where lies the paramount interest.
Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 468; petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3162 (Sept.
22, 1975) (No. 75-444).
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ilege rooted in the first amendment freedom of press.2 The
reasoning of the court also seems to indicate implicit approval
of at least part of the Stewart test for conditional constitutional
privilege. While not specifically applying the Stewart test, the
court of appeals paraphrased the compelling interest require-
ment for forced disclosure. 3 The touchstone of the Farr court's
test for its hybrid Powell/Stewart privilege appears to be the
absence of a conflicting interest so compelling as to override the
privilege. On the Farr facts, the court found such a countervail-
ing consideration in the trial judge's duty to protect sixth
amendment rights of defendants.
The Supreme Court, in Sheppard v. Maxwell,44 noted "the
pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of
effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of jurors," and
charged trial courts to "take strong measures to ensure that the
balance is never weighed against the accused."45 Holding that
a new trial must be ordered when prejudicial publicity was
likely to have threatened the fairness of a trial, the Court nev-
ertheless emphasized that "reversals are but palliatives; the
cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prej-
udice at its inception."4 The Sheppard Court suggested means
available to a trial judge for limiting the effect of prejudicial
publicity, including restrictions on the release of information
to the press by court officers or parties to the action. 7 The court
singled out collaboration between counsel and the press regard-
ing information that might affect the fairness of a criminal trial
as "not only subject to regulation, but . . . highly censurable
and worthy of disciplinary measures." The court of appeals
42. Id. at 467.
43. Compare text accompanying note 34 supra with the court's summary of the
district court decision it affirmed: "[T]he court below concluded that the newsman's
privilege must yield to the more important and compelling need for disclosure." 522
F.2d at 469.
44. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
45. Id. at 362.
46. Id. at 363 quoted in Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 468; petition for cert. filed,
44 U.S.L.W. 3162 (Sept. 22, 1975) (No. 75-444).
47. Among the Court's suggestions were limiting newspersons' access to the
courtroom; insulating witnesses; regulating release of investigatory leads to the press
by police; prohibiting the release of possible testimony by counsel and witnesses; and
prohibiting extrajudicial statements by court officials, witnesses, counsel, or parties.
Id. at 358-62.
48. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966), quoted in Farr v. Pitchess,
522 F.2d 464, 468; petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3162 (Sept. 22, 1975) (No. 75-
444).
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found the trial judge's publicity order clearly within the scope
of the Sheppard rule.4"
The Farr decision has been criticized, particularly by
newspersons, as yet another in a series of decisions which coun-
tenance an abridgement of the first amendment. 0 In the final
analysis, however, the court's determination that reporter
Farr's privilege was in this instance outweighed by a para-
mount interest may be less significant than its clear affirma-
tion of the existence of such a privilege. Despite its telegraphic
quality, the opinion may indeed offer considerable clarification
of the nature and scope of the journalist's privilege against
compelled disclosure. First, the court has indicated that a
claim of privilege by a newsperson is governed by Branzburg,
with its divergent opinions. Second, newspersons do possess
limited immunity from forced disclosure of confidential
sources. The court has recognized the privilege as part of the
first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. Third, the
need to protect a defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair
trial will abrogate the newsperson's testimonial privilege.
The court's failure to specify its criteria prevents clear
prediction of what other interests might overwhelm the claim
of privilege. Reference to a need to weigh the competing inter-
ests "in light of the surrounding facts and [strike] a balance"5'
suggests that the Farr court adopted Justice Powell's method,
which requires that the validity of each claim be judged by
balancing broad notions of freedom of the press against equally
broad and ill-defined notions that citizens are obligated to give
relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. Each
claim of privilege would be adjudicated with reference to the
balancing test. There is considerable ambiguity, however, in
the Farr court's reference to the "important and compelling"5
49. Appreciating the danger that sensational publicity could have transformed
the Manson trial into an unconstitutional spectacle, the Farr court approved of the Los
Angeles trial judge's issuance of a "gag order." 522 F.2d at 468. There was no authority
in Sheppard for directly restraining press reporting, and the trial judge never at-
tempted to prohibit publication of Farr's story.
The Sheppard license for "gag orders" is cited in Frazier v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.
3d 287, 486 P.2d 694, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1971); Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138,
106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973); Hamilton v. Municipal Court, 270 Cal. App. 797, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 168, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
50. New York Times, Aug. 10, 1975, at 34, col. 4; Landry, Fair Trial and Free
Press: A Due Process Proposal-The Challenge of the Communications Media, 62
A.B.A.J. 55 (1976).
51. 522 F.2d at 468.
52. Id. at 469.
19761
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nature of the conflicting sixth amendment right-language
which suggests the more exacting compelling state interest test
of the Stewart dissent. But the distinction may be purely aca-
demic. Because the Ninth Circuit recognizes the newsperson's
privilege as rooted in the first amendment it would seem that
whether the test applied were the Powell balancing standard
or the Stewart compelling interest rule, the conflicting state
interest would have to be of constitutional dimension to out-
weigh a constitutional privilege. The use of contempt power to
force disclosure of sources would seem valid only in instances
where constitutional rights are being protected or enforced.
Such an interpretation of the Farr decision was recently
made by the California Court of Appeal in Rosato v. Superior
Court.53 A Fresno County grand jury investigating corruption
indicted a city councilman, prominent land developer, and for-
mer planning commissioner on counts of bribery and conspir-
acy. A superior court judge, mindful of his Sheppard obligation
in a trial of widespread public interest, ordered the transcripts
of grand jury proceedings sealed, and issued an "Order re Pub-
licity" similar to the one issued in Farr.54 When The Fresno Bee
obtained and published portions of the transcripts, the superior
court ordered Bee reporters and editors to reveal the identity
of the person(s) who had supplied the transcripts. The news-
persons refused, 5 and were cited for contempt and ordered tojail until they complied with the order to disclose. " Relying in
part on the Farr decision, the California Court of Appeal found
some constitutional merit in the claims of privilege. 7
As a result of the Farr and Rosato decisions, then, the
limited testimonial privilege which the Branzburg plurality
found unacceptable appears to be firmly established in Califor-
nia.5" If subsequent interpretations of Farr focus on the compel-
53. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975).
54. Id. at 199-201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34.
55. Id. at 201-05, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434-36.
56. Id. at 199 n.2, 205, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 432 n.2, 436.
57. Id. at 230-31, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
58. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966) was amended in 1971 in response to
the first Farr case to provide protection for any person who had been connected with
or employed by newsgathering organizations. The 1973 amendment gave a shield to
any newsperson who appeared before any body which had the power to subpoena. The
1974 amendment struck the requirement that information be published before shield
protection could be afforded newspersons. The shield law presently states:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed
upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a
press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connected
[Vol. 16
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ling interest language, and if courts limit the Farr holding, as
Rosato did, to its facts-that is, a collision of constitutional
rights situation, where a valid protective order has admittedly
been violated-then newspersons in California would seem to
enjoy a broad privilege from forced testimony. They may refuse
to disclose their confidential sources when the information at
issue has come from persons other than those subject to a valid
"Order re Publicity," and when the answers demanded might
reveal the identity of sources not affected by the court order.59
If this is the case, courts will reject a claim of journalist's privi-
lege only when the privilege conflicts with a compelling interest
of constitutional merit, or the newsperson has directly observed
or participated in a breach of criminal statutes."
Farr is but one in a series of "free press v. fair trial" cases
decided since Branzburg.A' Newspersons have consistently
challenged court orders to reveal confidential sources. Despite
facing indefinite incarceration for their silence, only a very few
reporters have betrayed their confidants. 2 Branzburg and sub-
sequent reporter's privilege opinions have not altered a long
tradition of the American press honoring promises of confiden-
tiality. Legal commentary on the continuing tension between
the courtroom and pressroom might more usefully be directed
to exploring remedies available to jailed reporters in their at-
or employed, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative,
administrative body, or any other body having the power to issue sub-
poenas, for refusing to disclose, in any proceeding as defined in Section
901, the source of any information procured while so connected or em-
ployed for publication in a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical pub-
lication, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained
or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for com-
munication to the public.
CAL. EViD. CODE § 1070(a) (West Supp. 1975). See Comment, Newsman's Privilege: A
Survey of the Law in California, 4 PACIFIC L.J. 880 (1973); Comment, Journalists in
the Courts: Toward Effective Shield Legislation, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 664, 693 (1974).
59. The Rosato court held that the shield law offers protection against the revela-
tion of all sources other than court officers, and that a reporter cannot be required to
divulge information which would tend to reveal any source other than those court
officers subject to the orders issued by the court. Accordingly, the court reversed the
contempt convictions which resulted from refusal to answer questions not precisely
directed to discovering the identity of persons subject to the "Order re Publicity." 51
Cal. App. 3d 190, 224-25, 242-47, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 450, 454-59 (1975).
60. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972); Rosato v. Superior Court,
51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 218-19, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 446 (1975).
61. E. KNAPPMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA IN CONFLICT-1970-74, at 115-57
(1974); The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The Press Censorship
Newsletter, 1973-75.
62. C. WHALEN, YOUR RIGHT TO KNOW 45-47 (1973).
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tempts to challenge the indeterminate nature of inevitable con-
tempt sentences, rather than to chronicaling and commenting
upon the latest constitutional refinements of "free press v. fair
trial" cases.63
Thomas J Flynn
63. On February 16, 1976, a report of the Legal Advisory Committee on Fair Trial
and Free Press dealing with judicial restrictive orders was offered for consideration by
the ABA House of Delegates. The report recommended replacing Standing Orders
concerning disclosure of information in criminal proceedings, which are punishable by
contempt, with Standing Guidelines that would not be enforceable by contempt. It
further recommended that entry of a Standing Order be permitted only after notice
and opportunity to be heard had been given to all interested parties, including news-
persons, and after facts had been set forth to show that less restrictive means would
be inadequate to protect the rights of defendants. ABA Press Release No. 021576(February 15, 1976). Consideration of the report was deferred until the annual meeting
of the ABA in August, 1976. ABA Press Release No. 021976 (February 19, 1976).
PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY-THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT REJECTS THE POSITION OF THE
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT BY ALLOWING EXPAN-
SION OF THE FEDERAL PROSECUTOR'S RIGHT OF
DISCOVERY-United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
Late in the morning of February 6, 1973, four armed men
entered a Crocker National Bank in Los Angeles.' Three of the
men positioned themselves in various areas of the bank, guard-
ing the customers and personnel, while the fourth emptied the
tellers' cages.' A surveillance camera photographed each of the
participants in the robbery except the individual who had se-
lected a position directly below the camera.'
Several months later, Robert Lee Nobles was arrested and
tried in a Los Angeles federal district court for bank robbery.
The Government attempted to prove that Nobles, a black man,
was the individual who had not been photographed by the
Crocker National Bank's surveillance camera; but with the
exception of a bank teller and one customer, none of the people
in the bank at the time of the robbery were able to identify
Nobles.5 On cross-examination by Nobles' counsel, the teller
testified that he did not recall telling an investigator for the
Public Defender that he had seen only the back of the head of
the robber beneath the camera.' Similarly, the customer de-
nied having told the investigator that all blacks look alike.7 The
identification testimony of the teller and the customer was the
only significant evidence against Nobles.'
After the Government completed its case, Nobles' counsel
sought to introduce the testimony of his investigator.! How-
ever, the court conditioned that testimony on the defense
agreeing to allow the Government to examine those portions of
the investigator's report which contained the statements of the
1. United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom.
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 150.
6. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 227-28 (1975).
7. Id. at 228.
8. The only other incriminating evidence was Nobles' denial at the time of his
arrest that he was Robert Nobles and a later statement that he was aware that the
FBI had been looking for him. Id. at 227 n.1.
9. Id. at 229.
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impeached witnesses.'" The court's order provided for in
camera inspection of the report after the investigator had given
his testimony, with the court to excise all irrelevant material
and turn the remainder over to the prosecutor." Nobles' coun-
sel refused to allow any inspection of the report, 2 and the court
ruled that the defendant could not offer the investigator's testi-
mony for the purpose of impeaching the prosecutor's wit-
nesses.1
3
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohib-
ited the disclosure condition imposed by the district court.'
The circuit court relied principally on Prudhomme v. Superior
Court,' wherein the California Supreme Court stated that the
privilege against self-incrimination "forbids compelled disclo-
sure which could serve as a 'link in a chain' of evidence tending
to establish guilt of a criminal offense."'" The court of appeals
also noted that this position had been taken in United States
v. Frarello,"7 and by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in United States v. Wright. In addition, the
Ninth Circuit held that rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure applied to discovery at trial, and that rule 16(c)
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 155 (9th Cir. 1974).
15. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
16. Id. at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
17. 44 F.R.D. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
18. 489 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit quoted with approval this
passage:
The defendant has a right under the Fifth Amendment to compel the
state to investigate its own case, find its own evidence, and prove its own
facts. The defense has no duty to help the prosecution convict the defen-
dant. We therefore reject any rule which would require the defense to turn
over to the prosecution any statements or defense witnesses which could
be used by the prosecution as evidence against the accused.
United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 155 (9th Cir. 1974), quoting United States v.
Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
19. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(c), 18 U.S.C.A. (1970), stated that if discovery was
sought by the defendant pursuant to the applicable subsection of rule 16, the request
could be conditioned on a limited, reciprocal right of discovery by the Government,
which had to show that its request was reasonable and material to the preparation of
its case. If these conditions were met, the court could allow the Government "to inspect
and copy or photograph scientific or medical reports, books, papers, documents, tangi-
ble objects, or copies or portions thereof .... " However, rule 16(c) expressly immu-
nized from discovery a large class of material:
Except as to scientific or medical reports, this subdivision does not au-
thorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other inter-
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precluded prosecutorial discovery of material contained in the
investigator's report.20
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision, holding that the district court's order was
within the legitimate bounds of prosecutorial discovery. The
Court2 held that the investigator's report was of evidentiary
value since it related to the credibility of the investigator. Only
the work product doctrine, it stated, would bar discovery of
such a report.22 Conditioning the testimony of the investigator
on the production of the report was proper, however, because
the defendant waived his work product privilege by offering to
have his investigator testify.23 The Nobles Court expanded the
concept of prosecutorial discovery in the federal court system
by holding that if an agent of the defendant's lawyer offers
testimony impeaching a Government witness, reports of the
agent's interviews with the witness are available for limited
prosecutorial discovery.2
The Nobles decision reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding
that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 applied to at-trial
nal defense documents made by the defendant, or his attorneys or agents
in connection with the investigation or defense of the case, or of state-
ments made by the defendant, or the government or defense witnesses,
or by prospective government or defense witnesses, to the defendant, his
agents or attorneys.
This rule has since been amended. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c), and text accompanying
notes 98-100 infra.
20. The court of appeals acknowledged that rule 16 was framed in terms of
pretrial discovery. 501 F.2d at 157. However, it held that the incorporation of the
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), into rule 16 caused the rule to have general
relevance to discovery during trial. 501 F.2d at 157. The Jencks Act allows the defense
to discover, for purposes of impeachment, statements of Government witnesses who
have testified. Since subsection (c) did not provide for a similar right of discovery by
the Government, and the "work product" of the defense was expressly excluded from
discovery, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Government had been denied this
discovery right. Id. at 157.
21. This decision was reached in the absence of Mr. Justice Douglas.
22. See 422 U.S. at 236. Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
disagreed with the majority on this point. While concurring in the result, these Justices
contended that not even the work product privilege protected the investigator's report.
Id. at 246-47. See text accompanying notes 50-54 infra for a discussion of the work
product privilege.
23. 422 U.S. at 239-40.
24. Id. at 227. The Court emphasized the limitations imposed on the disputed
order. The trial court intended, after inspecting and editing the report in camera, to
allow discovery only of the precise statements at issue. Since the presence or absence
in the report of impeaching statements attributed to the Government's witnesses was
claimed to be relevant to the issue of credibility, the order was framed so that only
the presence or absence of the statements in the report would be established by discov-
ery. Id. at 228-29, 240.
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discovery.25 Rule 16(c) 6 allows discovery by the Government
only if discovery has been requested by the defendant. In addi-
tion, all reports of the defendant's attorneys and agents are
expressly immunized from discovery by subsection (c). 27 How-
ever, the Supreme Court stated that "the language and history
of the rule indicate that it addresses only pretrial discovery."2
The Court conceded that the rule had some relevance to at-
trial discovery procedure, since Congress had incorporated the
Jencks Act 9 into the rule.3 However, the Court held that the
Jencks Act provision, which allows the defendant, for purposes
of impeachment, to discover statements of Government wit-
nesses who have testified at trial, did not convert the rule into
"a general limitation on the trial court's broad discretion as to
evidentiary questions at trial."'"
The Supreme Court then considered two sixth amendment
arguments. The defendant argued that the district court's
order deprived him of his sixth amendment rights to compul-
sory process and cross-examination.32 Although this claim was
rejected, the Court seemed to suggest that the argument would
have been compelling if the order had barred absolutely the
investigator's testimony.3 However, since the order merely
placed a condition on the admissibility of the investigator's
testimony, Nobles had not been deprived of these rights. 4 In
addition, the Court held that the sixth amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel was not violated because the
order resulted from the defense counsel's "voluntary election to
make testimonial use of his investigator's report."35 The Court
further suggested that even had he not made this election, the
right to effective assistance of counsel was not impaired in view
of the limited nature of the district court's order.3"
The Court dispensed in summary fashion with Nobles'
fifth amendment argument,37 characterizing the holding of the
25. Id. at 234-35.
26. See note 19 supra.
27. Id.
28. 422 U.S. at 235.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
30. 422 U.S. at 236. See note 20 supra.
31. 422 U.S. at 236.
32. Id. at 241.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 240 n.15.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 233-34.
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Ninth Circuit on this issue as an over-broad generalization."8
Placing principal reliance on Couch v. United States,39 the
Supreme Court held that "the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, being personal to the
defendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of
third parties called as witnesses at trial."4 Clear emphasis was
placed on the limited scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination.'
The Couch decision provides questionable authority for
the proposition advanced by the Court. Couch involved an In-
ternal Revenue Service Agent's demand to see a taxpayer's
records. 2 An Internal Revenue Service summons was issued,
directing an accountant to produce the business records sup-
plied by the taxpayer for preparation of her tax returns from
1955 to 1968.11 The accountant refused the demand and sent
the records to the taxpayer's attorney." The United States
Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment did not protect
the records and the attorney was compelled to produce them.45
However, the Couch Court carefully limited its decision to
the right of an accountant to invoke the fifth amendment to
protect the financial records of his client.4" The Court called
attention to the fact that the "rights and obligations of the
parties became fixed when the summons was served . . . ."I
Thus the fact that the records subsequently came into the pos-
session of the taxpayer's attorney was irrelevant. The Court
stated that there could be "little expectation of privacy where
records are handed to an accountant."48 "The basic complaint
of petitioner," the Court ruled, "stems from the fact of divulg-
ence of the possibly incriminating information, not from the
manner in which or the person from whom it was extracted." 9
The issue in Nobles was precisely the converse of this.
After dismissing Nobles' constitutional arguments, the
38. 422 U.S. at 233.
39. 409 U.S. 322 (1972).
40. 422 U.S. at 234.
41. Id. at 233-34.
42. 409 U.S. at 335.
43. Id. at 338.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 336.
46. Id. at 329.
47. Id. at 309 n.4.
48. Id. at 335.
49. Id. at 329.
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Court held that the material contained in the investigator's
report fell under the work product privilege established in
Hickman v. Taylor." The plaintiff in that civil case had sought
discovery of statements of witnesses obtained by the defense
counsel in preparation for trial.5' The Hickman Court recog-
nized that some of the material in the possession of an attorney
should be protected from the scrutiny of his adversary,52 and
in recognition of this need it established a "qualified privilege
for certain material prepared by an attorney acting for his
client in anticipation of litigation." 3 The Court stated, "Proper
presentation of a client's case demands that the attorney as-
semble information, sift what he considers to be relevant from
the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his
strategy without undue and needless interference."54
Nonetheless, the Nobles Court held that the work product
privilege is waived when counsel makes testimonial use of the
protected material.5 From this premise, it determined that the
defense counsel's election to present the testimony of his inves-
tigator had waived the defendant's privilege with respect to the
investigator's report insofar as the investigator's testimony re-
lated to matters contained therein. 56
Thus, the work product privilege provides uncertain pro-
tection for reports by agents of an attorney. First, the Court did
not limit the notion of waiver to situations in which testimonial
use is made of the material. The Court stated broadly, "What
constitutes a waiver with respect to work product materials
depends, of course, upon the circumstances."57 It would appear
that the trial judge is invested with a significant amount of
discretion in determining what constitutes a waiver. Second,
even if the privilege is not waived, it may be overcome. The
work product privilege was established to protect an attorney
50. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
51. Id. at 498-99.
52. Id. at 510-11.
53. Id. at 508. The Supreme Court added this qualification:
We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared
by an attorney's counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free
from discovery in all cases. Where relevant and nonprivileged facts re-
main hidden in an attorney's file and where production is essential to the
preparation of one's case, discovery may be had.
329 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added).
54. 329 U.S. at 511.
55. 422 U.S. at 239 n.14.
56. Id. at 239.
57. Id. at 239 n.14.
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from "undue and needless interference"; a showing of good
cause is sufficient to overcome the protection of the privilege."
If this burden is met by the prosecution, it would follow that
discovery is allowed whether or not the material is intended for
use at trial.
The Supreme Court completely ignored Prudhomme, the
case upon which the Ninth Circuit relied for its conclusion that
the report was protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination. This omission is tacit acknowledgment that the
California Supreme Court interprets the privilege against self-
incrimination in a way that is fundamentally at odds with the
interpretation of the United States Supreme Court. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held in Prudhomme that the privilege
against self-incrimination forbids compelled disclosures which
"conceivably might lighten the prosecutor's burden of proving
its case-in-chief."59 The Prudhomme rule allowed prosecutorial
discovery only of material which "cannot possibly tend to in-
criminate the [defendant]."" ° Prudhomme dealt with pretrial
discovery, but the principles it ennunciated, as the Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized, are equally applicable to discovery during
trial.'
This divergence between the state and federal standards
stems from the California Supreme Court's reliance on the
privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the California
Constitution.2 Although the states may not abridge the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination as applied to
the states by the fourteenth amendment,63 they may establish
stricter standards. 4 The fifth amendment, as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court, sets a minimum standard
which does not foreclose California from providing enhanced
protection."
The California Supreme Court in Prudhomme refused to
permit discovery to drive a wedge between the defendant and
58. Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 Geo. L.J. 1281
(1966).
59. Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 326, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 133 (1970).
60. Id. at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
61. United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 154 (9th Cir. 1974); see People v. Bais,
31 Cal. App. 3d 663, 107 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1973).
62. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
63. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1963).
64. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
65. See, e.g., Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 229 (1964).
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his counsel. Treating the material collected and prepared by
the defense counsel as if it were information personal to the
defendant, the Prudhomme court held that the "defendant
must be given the same right as an ordinary witness to show
that disclosure of particular information could incriminate
him.""6
The California court traced the underlying rationale for its
position to earlier United States Supreme Court decisions. 7 It
quoted with approval Malloy v. Hogan,"8 which stated that
"governments, state and federal, are constitutionally com-
pelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely
secured," and reiterated the principle, often endorsed by the
United States Supreme Court,6" that "[tihe People must
'shoulder the entire load' of their burden of proof in their case
in chief .... "70
In contrast to Prudhomme, Nobles represents perhaps a
final rejection of the view that the fifth amendment mandates
the Government to "shoulder the entire load" when attempting
to convict an individual of a crime. This argument was fully
developed in the context of prosecutorial discovery by Mr. Jus-
tice Black, dissenting in Williams v. Florida,7 a case contem-
poraneous with Prudhomme. Mr. Justice Black contended that
the Constitution guarantees an absolute, unqualified right to
the defendant to "compel the State to investigate its own case,
66. 2 Cal. 3d at 324, 466 P.2d at 676, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
67. See id. The Prudhomme court cited Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
68. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
69. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965), the Court ruled that
the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege against self-
incrimination is the respect a government-state or federal-must accord
to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a "fair state-
individual balance," to require the government to "shoulder the entire
load," . . . to protect the inviolability of the human personality, our
accusatorial system of criminal justice demands that the government
seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its
own independent labors.
Id. at 460. For other examples, see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1963). See note 19
supra.
70. Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 327, 466 P.2d 673, 676, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 133 (1970). This rationale appears to have originated with Dean Wigmore.
Our sense of fair-play, he wrote, demands "a fair state-individual balance by requiring
the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government to shoulder the entire load." 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE 317 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
71. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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find its own witnesses, prove its own facts, and convince the
jury through its own resources."7 The Constitution, he stated,
gives the defendant a "tactical advantage" 3 designed to pro-
tect "freedom" in our political system.' Mr. Justice White,
' 5
Mr. Justice Stewart," and Chief Justice Burger" have taken
similar positions in earlier opinions.
Although this argument appeared to have been accepted
by the Court in Miranda v. Arizona,"s it was not accepted in
Williams, and has been rejected in many recent Supreme Court
decisions.79 The Nobles opinion, by requiring the production of
evidence gathered by the defendant's agent, is a sweeping ex-
ample of the Court's present reluctance to endorse Justice
Black's theory. Rather than emphasizing the Court's duty to
protect the rights of the accused, Nobles emphasized the truth-
finding goal of our system of justice: "'The need to develop all
relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated
if judgments were to be founded on a partial and speculative
presentation of the facts .. ' "80
This justification for the expansion of prosecutorial discov-
ery had not been suggested by the Court prior to the Nobles
decision. In Williams, it had allowed pretrial prosecutorial dis-
covery of material which the defendant intended to produce as
evidence at trial, but the Court had based its action on the
72. Id. at 112.
73. Id. at 111.
74. Id. at 112.
75. Justice White once wrote:
The state has the obligation to present the evidence. Defense counsel
need present nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. He need not
furnish any witnesses to the police, or furnish other information to help
the prosecution's case . . . .Our interest in not convicting the innocent
permits counsel to put the State to its proof.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (dissenting and concurring
opinion).
76. Justice Stewart once wrote:
The basic purposes behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not
relate to protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather in preserving
the integrity of the judicial system in which even the guility are not to
be convicted unless the prosecution "shoulder the entire burden."
Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
77. See Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 294-95 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger,
Circuit Judge, dissenting).
78. 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
79. See Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARv.'L. REV.
1002 (1972).
80. 422 U.S. at 230-31, quoting United States v. Nixon 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
1976]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
rationale that, since the material was going to be produced as
evidence by the defendant, it must be presumed to be exculpa-
tory and not inculpatory.' Therefore, it held, the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination could not be invoked
to protect the material. 2 In contrast, Nobles allowed discovery
of material which the defendant wished to keep out of evi-
dence. 3 Clearly, it could not be presumed that the material
was exculpatory. Consequently, the "truth-finding" justifica-
tion for discovery offered in Nobles treats as irrelevant the
question of whether the material is inculpatory or exculpa-
tory .4
The favor with which the United States Supreme Court
views prosecutorial discovery was demonstrated by its willing-
ness to grant discovery despite the comparatively slight need
shown by the prosecution in Nobles.5 Pretrial discovery in
Williams was said to further the legitimate state interests of
avoiding undue surprise and unnecessary delay of the trial, by
allowing thorough prosecutorial preparation. 8 The discovery
allowed in Nobles furthers none of these interests, and in effect
compensates the Government for its failure to prepare ade-
quately. The witnesses in Nobles were prosecution witnesses,
who should have been thoroughly interviewed before the trial
began. Also, the witnesses who had allegedly given the im-
peaching statements to the investigator were present at the
trial. The prosecutor could have adequately rebutted the testi-
mony of the investigator merely by calling the witnesses to the
stand. In other words, disclosure of the contents of the investi-
gator's report was not necessary to "'develop all relevant
facts,'" and denial of discovery would not have kept from the
prosecutor any information it could not have obtained by its
own efforts. Only future decisions will determine the extent to
which the Court is willing to allow the prosecutor to profit by
the efforts of defense investigation.
While possibly facilitating the courts' truth-finding func-
tion, the effect of Nobles is to add to the State's already enor-
mous advantage over the defendant in its ability to gather
81. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970).
82. Id.
83. 422 U.S. at 228-29.
84. Id. at 231-32. See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
85. See 422 U.S. at 228 & n.4.
86. 399 U.S. at 81, 86.
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evidence. 7 The Nobles Court justified its expansion of prosecu-
torial discovery by pointing out that the Jencks Act would have
allowed defense discovery of the report if the investigator had
been a Government witness.88 This suggests that the Court's
notion of "reciprocal discovery"89 will not work to effect a true
"balance of forces between the accused and the accuser,'
9
given the inherent "superiority of the prosecution's facilities for
fact-finding." '9'
Prosecutorial discovery is a relatively recent procedural
innovation and from its inception it has been clouded by con-
stitutional considerations. 2 Thus, for example, when rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was amended in 1966
to provide a limited right of discovery for the prosecutor, Jus-
tices Black93 and Douglas 4 dissented, suggesting that there
were fifth amendment difficulties with the rule. Other com-
mentators,95 as well as the California Supreme Court,98 have
thought the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to be the chief constitutional impediment to pro-
secutorial discovery.
By restricting the application of rule 16(c) to pretrial dis-
covery, and allowing a broader scope for discovery during
trial, the Nobles decision dispells any lingering doubt as to
the constitutionality of rule 16(c). In addition, Nobles places
the new, broader amendment to rule 16, which was adopted
five weeks after the Nobles decision, on sound constitutional
footing. The most recent amendment to rule 16 enhances
the federal prosecutor's right of discovery in three significant
respects: (1) the list of discoverable material is expanded to
include photographs;98 (2) if discovery is granted to the de-
87. See id. at 112 (Black, J., dissenting); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473
(1973).
88. 422 U.S. at 231.
89. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
90. Id. at 474.
91. Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, Circuit
Judge, dissenting).
92. See 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 256, 253-58 (1969).
93. 39 F.R.D. 69, 272 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 276 (Douglas, J., dissenting).'
95. See, e.g., Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HAST. L.J. 905-10 (1968); and note
92 supra.
96. Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 324, 466 P.2d 673, 675, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 131 (1970).
97. This amendment was signed into law by President Ford on August 2, 1975,
to become effective December 7, 1975.
98. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A) with Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 (c), 18
19761
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fense, reciprocal discovery by the prosecution is a matter of
right, and not within the discretion of the trial judge;9 and (3)
the prosecution is no longer required to show that its request
is reasonable and material to the preparation of its case.10
These developments appear to serve the truth-finding function
of the judicial system without impinging on the defendant's
constitutional rights as they were defined in Nobles.101 The
United States Supreme Court's present view of the role of the
courts, coupled with the Court's narrow interpretation of con-
stitutional prohibitions, indicates that the Court views expan-
sion of the discovery powers of the prosecutor with favor.
Rand L. Koler
U.S.C.A. (1970).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See text accompanying notes 32-41 supra.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-LOCAL AGENCY FORMA-
TION COMMISSIONS MUST COMPLY WITH REQUIRE-
MENTS OF CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
ACT BEFORE APPROVING ANNEXATION PROPOSALS
OF CITIES-Bozung v. LAFCO of Ventura County, 13 Cal. 3d
263, 529 P.2d 1017, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975).
In 1968, the Ventura County Local Agency Formation
Commission (LAFCO) divided a 677-acre parcel known as Bell
Ranch between the two "spheres of influence"' allocated, re-
spectively, to the city of Camarillo and the unincorporated area
of Las Posas. In August, 1970, the Kaiser-Aetna Corporation,
owner of the land, requested that LAFCO adjust the spheres
of influence. LAFCO complied, assigning all of Bell Ranch to
the Las Posas sphere. The following year, the Ventura LAFCO
again shifted the sphere of influence lines, placing Bell Ranch
entirely within the Camarillo sphere. The city of Camarillo and
Kaiser-Aetna requested in April, 1972, that LAFCO approve
Camarillo's proposed annexation of Bell Ranch. Kaiser's appli-
cation stated that the land, presently used for agricultural pur-
poses, was designated "for residential, commercial and recrea-
tional uses," and that such development was "anticipated...
in the near future."' LAFCO approved the proposed annexa-
tion, and on July 26, 1972, Camarillo adopted an ordinance
annexing Bell Ranch to the city.
A number of Ventura County taxpayers and residents liv-
ing in the area brought an action in August, 1972, seeking
declaratory relief and a writ of mandate requiring the Ventura
County LAFCO to file an environmental impact report (EIR)
before appoving the annexation proposal. The plaintiffs alleged
that the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA),3
which requires local agencies to file an EIR on any project
likely to affect the environment, applied to the LAFCO annex-
1. The creation of LAFCOs was an attempt by the legislature to coordinate the
numerous agencies operating at the local level, many of them offering duplicative
services in overlapping areas. See text accompanying notes 7-15 infra. One of the chief
functions of LAFCO is to minimize this overlap by allocating "spheres of influence"
to various local entities in order to facilitate such activities as annexation and land
use planning. A sphere of influence is a plan for the probable ultimate physical bound-
aries and service areas of the local agency as determined by the Local Agency Forma-
tion Commission. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 54774 (West Supp. 1974).
2. Bozung v. LAFCO of Ventura County, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 270-71, 529 P.2d 1017,
1021, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 253 (1975).
3. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21000 et seq. (West Supp. 1974).
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ation approval in question, and that the defendant LAFCO had
violated its duty by failing to prepare and file an EIR before
holding hearings and approving the proposed annexation. The
plaintiffs urged the trial court to set aside LAFCO's annexation
approval and to prevent Camarillo from enacting the annexa-
tion ordinance. Ventura County LAFCO and Kaiser-Aetna
filed demurrers to the complaint which were sustained without
leave to amend. The California Court of Appeal reversed the
judgment of the trial court, holding that under California law,
an EIR should have been filed by the Ventura County LAFCO
before it gave approval to Camarillo's proposed annexation of
the Bell Ranch property.' The California Supreme Court held
that the court of appeal had correctly disposed of the issues
involved and adopted, almost verbatim, the appellate court's
opinion .'
The essence of the Bozung opinion is the court's determi-
nation that the powers and duties of LAFCOs are set forth not
only in the Knox-Nisbet Act,' the legislation which created
LAFCOs, but also in CEQA. A brief history of these acts is
helpful in appreciating the significance of Bozung.
Prior to 1963, rapid urban growth in California had helped
create a virtually unmanageable situation in local government.
Cities competing for unincorporated territories developed irreg-
ular boundaries marked by "strips," "cherry stems," and "cor-
ridors"; 7 special districts proliferated, providing duplicative
services in overlapping areas8 and there were many undesirable
special interest incorporations? The Knox-Nisbet Act, passed
in 1973 as an attempt to deal with these problems,'" created
4. Bozung v. LAFCO of Ventura County, 112 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1974).
5. 13 Cal. 3d at 267, 529 P.2d at 1019-20, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52.
6. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54773 et seq. (West Supp. 1974).
7. R. LEGATES, CALIFORNIA LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSIONS 4 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as LEGATES].
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id. at 4-6. One commentator observed:
By 1963, conditions in California had become so anarchic that they were
intolerable. The pressures of the population boom and the speed of ur-
banization were forcing continuous modifications in governmental struc-
ture throughout the state. Laws designed for a simpler era were not effec-
tive in controlling the avarice and myopia of contending entities. Various
pressures were creating an unmanageable and inequitable patchwork of
governments unresponsive to the needs of the people of California.
Id. at 8.
10. This legislation was a compromise between two opposing positions. The Gov-
ernor's Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems favored a powerful statewide com-
mission having final approval of all boundary changes, incorporation of cities, annexa-
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LAFCO, a hybrid commission of state and local government
sitting at the county level." The stated purposes of LAFCOs
are "the discouragement of urban sprawl and the encourage-
ment of the orderly formation and development of local
governmental agencies based upon local conditions and
circumstances."'" LAFCOs are given the power to review and
approve or disapprove wholly, partially, or conditionally, pro-
posals for (1) the incorporation of cities; (2) the formation of
special districts; (3) the annexation of territory to local agen-
cies; (4) the exclusion of territory from a city; (5) the disincor-
poration of a city; and (6) the consolidation of two or more
cities.'3
In addition, LAFCOs are required to develop "spheres of
influence" for each local governmental agency within the
county for the purpose of minimizing duplication of services
and coordinating land use planning." Among the factors to be
considered in allocating a sphere of influence to a particular
agency are the range of services the agency can provide, the
projected population growth of the area, the type of develop-
ment planned, and the social and economic interdependence
and interaction between the area being considered and areas
surrounding it."
The California Supreme Court had never dealt with any
aspect of the Knox-Nisbet Act prior to Bozung. Furthermore,
California appellate courts had handed down only three deci-
sions dealing with LAFCOs, none of which did more than con-
firm or interpret powers enumerated in the Act itself.'6 How-
tion of territory by cities, and the formation of special districts. On the other hand,
the County Supervisors Association was for a commission that had only advisory
powers. Id. at 18. See also Jeffries, LAFCO: Is it in Control of Special Districts?, 23
HASTINGS L.J. 920 (1972).
11. A LAFCO is composed of two city council members, two members of the
county board of supervisors and a fifth member representing the general public. The
statute also allows for two representatives of special districts to sit on the commission.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54780 (West Supp. 1974).
12. Id. § 54774.
13. Id. § 54790(a). The powers of LAFCOs were further defined by the District
Reorganization Act of 1965 which sets out a unified procedure for rationalizing the
pattern of special district formation in California. Id. § 56000 et seq.
14. Id. § 54774.
15. Id. (b)-(f).
16. In San Mateo County Harbor Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 273 Cal. App.
2d 165, 77 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1969), the court held that in considering a proposed dissolu-
tion of a harbor district, a LAFCO cannot delegate its authority to approve or disap-
prove this dissolution to the county; the LAFCO must make a clear and definite
determination on the proposal. City of Ceres v. City of Modesto, 274 Cal. App. 2d 545,
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ever, in Bozung, the Supreme Court has greatly broadened the
scope of LAFCO by effectively incorporating CEQA into the
Knox-Nisbet Act.
The California Environmental Quality Act, as originally
enacted in 1970, requires local governmental agencies to pre-
pare an environmental impact report on any project they in-
tend to carry out which might have a significant effect on the
environment. 7 In 1972, the California Supreme Court, in the
landmark decision of Friends of Mammoth v. Board of
Supervisors,"8 interpreted CEQA as requiring governmental
agencies to prepare and consider an EIR for private activities
that might have a significant effect on the environment and for
which a governmental permit or other entitlement for use is
required. In Friends of Mammoth, the supreme court con-
cluded that the legislature intended CEQA "to be interpreted
in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to
the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory
language."'"
In response to Friends of Mammoth, the legislature
amended CEQA in 1972 so that the Act would apply to all
discretionary projects proposed to be carried out or approved
by public agencies. 21 Public agencies are now required to de-
velop objectives, criteria and procedures for the evaluation of
79 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969), dealt with an annexation feud between two cities. The court
here clarified the LAFCO's functions and the importance of its decisions. LAFCO's
tentative designation of the cities' future boundaries was not a final decision, and one
city could legally extend its sewer line into the designated sphere of the other city.
However, the court saw this as a futile and wasteful act since the allocation of the
disputed area to the sphere of one city meant that only that city would be able to annex
the area in the future. In Meyers v. LAFCO of Tulare County, 34 Cal. App. 3d 955,
110 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1973), the court made another clarification of LAFCOs' duties, this
time specifying that a LAFCO need only consider the criteria enumerated in the Knox-
Nisbet Act when considering an annexation proposal; it need not consider contentions
that the city had manipulated boundaries so that certain citizens could not vote on
the proposed annexation. All these decisions confirm the fact that LAFCOs were in-
tended by the legislature to exercise more than a merely advisory function, and that
local entities are not free to evade or disregard LAFCO decisions.
LAFCO is the 'watchdog' of the legislature established to guard against
the wasteful duplication of services that results from indiscriminate for-
mation of new local agencies or haphazard annexation of territory to
existing local agencies.
City of Ceres v. City of Modesto, supra at 553, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
17. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21151 (West Supp. 1974).
18. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
19. Id. at 259, 502 P.2d at 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
20. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 1974); Seneker, The Legislative
Response to Friends of Mammoth, 48 ST. BAR J. 126 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Seneker].
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projects and for the preparation of EIRs.2' The amended Act
also requires that the State Office of Planning and Research"
adopt guidelines detailing criteria for public agencies to use in
determining whether or not a proposed project may have a
significant effect on the environment." Thus, the legislation
has created a three-tier system: CEQA itself; the state Guide-
lines;24 and the regulations adopted by the public agencies."
5
Prior to Bozung, the Supreme Court had construed neither
CEQA as amended in 1972, nor the Guidelines in the Adminis-
trative Code. The appellate decisions dealing with EIRs be-
tween 1972 and the Bozung case can be divided roughly into
three categories': (1) those which consider the adequacy of a
particular EIR;5 (2) those which deal with the applicability of
CEQA to certain projects begun before the effective date of the
1972 amendments;2 and (3) those which are concerned with
whether an EIR is required, regardless of the 1972 amend-
ments. 28 The Bozung decision falls in the last of these catego-
21. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21082 (West Supp. 1974).
22. The Office of Planning and Research is a state planning agency in the Gover-
nor's office. One of its functions is to
[c]oordinate, in conjunction with appropriate state, regional and local
agencies, the development of objectives, criteria and procedures for the
orderly evaluation and report of the impact of public and private actions
on the environmental quality of the state and as a guide to the prepara-
tion of the environmental impact reports required of state local agencies
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65040(g) (West Supp. 1974).
23. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21083 (West Supp. 1974).
24. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15000 et seq. (1975).
25. Seneker, supra note 20, at 131.
26. The most important case on the issue of adequacy is Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water Dist., 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197
(1972), which held that the sufficiency of an EIR is clearly a question for the courts.
Other cases considering the adequacy of an EIR are Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Arcadia
City Council, 42 Cal. App. 3d 712, 117 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1974) (negative declaration
adequate as a matter of law); People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 67 (1974) (EIR fatally defective as a matter of law); Concerned Citizens of Palm
Desert, Inc. v. Riverside County Bd. of Supervisors, 38 Cal. App. 3d 372, 113 Cal. Rptr.
338 (1974) (EIR adequate as a matter of law).
27. These cases include Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Arcadia City Council, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 712, 117 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1974) (shopping center and parking lot projects ap-
proved before 1972 do not require an EIR); People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d
830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1974) (amendment to zoning ordinance requires an ER);
Friends of Lake Arrowhead v. San Bernandino County Bd. of Supervisors, 38 Cal. App.
3d 497, 113 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1974) (approval of tentative tract map and site development
plan is entitlement for use, but if issued during moratorium created by 1972 amend-
ments, does not require an EIR); Hixon v. County of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. App. 3d 370,
113 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1974) (street improvement completed before 1972 amendments
does not require EIR, and negative declaration was proper for further street improve-
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ries and is perhaps the farthest-reaching of this line of cases.
The Bozung court began its analysis by outlining the pro-
visions of the Knox-Nisbet Act. The court noted that the stat-
ute requires LAFCOs to consider environmental factors when
carrying out their two primary functions: (1) the development
of spheres of influence for each local agency within the county,
and (2) the approval or disapproval of annexation proposals.29
The court then looked to CEQA to determine whether its
provisions could be harmonized with the Knox-Nisbet Act "in
such a way that the objective common to both acts, the preven-
tion of damage to the environment, will be furthered to the
greatest extent which the language of both statutes fairly per-
mits.", 0
The first provision of CEQA which the court considered
requires governmental agencies at all levels to "develop stan-
dards and procedures necessary to protect environmental qual-
ity." The court found that a LAFCO is a "governmental
agency"-specifically, a "local agency"-within the meaning
of CEQA. The Bozung court, interpreting the CEQA section
which requires all local agencies to prepare and certify an EIR
on any project they intend to carry out or approve which may
have a "significant effect on the environment,"3 held that the
ments); Concerned Citizens of Palm Desert, Inc. v. Riverside County Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 38 Cal. App. 3d 257, 113 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1974) (zone changes and conditional use
permits require an EIR if issued after 1972 amendments); County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32
Cal. App. 3d 795, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973) (ground water extraction is an ongoing
project requiring an EIR); San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Ass'n v. Cen-
tral Permit Bureau, 30 Cal. App. 3d 920, 106 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1973) (permit to build
high rise hotel issued before 1972 amendments).
28. In County of Orange v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1973),
the court said, in dicta, that the approval of the land exchange agreement between the
county and a private developer in connection with the planned development of the bay
as a harbor would definitely require an EIR. Id. at 714, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 842. The court
in City of Orange v. Valenti, 37 Cal. App. 3d 240, 112 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1974), held that
the lease of a building for use as an employment insurance office by the state required
an EIR because the environmental impact of this "traffic snarling, parking congesting
activity, slam-bang in the middle of a quiet, single-family residential area" was defi-
nitely significant. Id. at 249, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 386. In Pacific Palisades Property
Owners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. App 3d 781, 117 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1974),
the court found that changing a building from rental units to condominiums did not
create a significant impact on the environment and did not require an EIR. Russian
Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 44 Cal. App. 3d 158, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 490 (1974), held that approval of building permits for two apartment towers must
be set aside when the city planning commission and board of permit appeals did not
comply with the reporting requirements of CEQA.
29. 13 Cal. 3d at 273-74, 529 P.2d at 1023-24, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56.
30. Id. at 274, 529 P.2d at 1024, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
31. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21001(f) (West Supp. 1974).
32. Id. § 21151.
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Ventura County LAFCO's activity relating to the Bell Ranch
annexation was a "project" as defined by the Guidelines: that
is, an activity "directly undertaken by any public agency...
involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license,
certificate or other entitlement for use by one or more public
agencies."33 Furthermore, the Guidelines specifically mention
that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances and
the adoption of local general plans are "projects." 4
The defendants contended in Bozung that LAFCO ap-
proval of an annexation proposal was more in the nature of a
feasibility or planning study,35 which the Guidelines explicitly
exclude from CEQA coverage. 6 The court responded by anal-
ogizing annexation approval by a LAFCO to the adoption of a
general plan. If the adoption of a tentative, modifiable general
plan is a project, the court reasoned, a LAFCO annexation
approval or disapproval, which is an irrevocable step for the
public agency involved, must surely qualify. The court also
concluded that the Bell Ranch annexation was the type of
"project" that would "ultimately culminate" in environmental
change."
The defendants next argued that preparing an EIR at this
stage was "premature and wasteful, since-at least in this
case-a further EIR will be required before Camarillo can ac-
tually rezone the Bell Ranch. 39 The court, referring to the
Guidelines, replied that "EIRs should be prepared as early in
the planning process as possible to enable environmental con-
siderations to influence the project, program or design."'" In
addition, the court noted that the Guidelines stress that EIRs
33. Id. § 21065(a), (c).
34. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15037(a) (1975). See also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
21080 (West Supp. 1974).
35. 13 Cal. 3d at 278-79, 529 P.2d at 1026, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
36. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15037(b) (1975).
37. 13 Cal. 3d at 278, 529 P.2d at 1027, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
38. The court reached this conclusion by turning to its decision in Friends of
Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 265, 502 P.2d 1049, 1061, 104 Cal. Rptr.
761, 773 (1972), where "project" as used in CEQA was interpreted as emphasizing
those activities which culminate in physical change to the environment. In response
to the Friends of Mammoth decision, the word "ultimately" was inserted into the
Guidelines definition of "project." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15037(a) (1975). Since
the application for the annexation approval stated that "urban growth will take place
in the designated areas and only within the annexation," 13 Cal. 3d at 281, 529 P.2d
at 1029, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 261, the Bozung court concluded that the project would
culminate in physical change to the environment.
39. Id. at 282, 529 P.2d at 1030, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
40. Id., citing CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14,'§ 15013 (1975).
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must describe the environment from both local and regional
perspectives, and that knowledge of the regional setting is criti-
cal to the assessment of environment impact.4' Because LAF-
COs are organized on a county level, they are far better
equipped to make such an analysis than the particular city or
local entity requesting the annexation approval; and more im-
portantly, LAFCOs can better balance the political forces in-
volved in annexations. Furthermore, an early EIR permits a
project to be studied in its entirety before it is broken down into
smaller sub-projects.4" Citing the Guidelines," the court con-
cluded that where related individual projects will ultimately
produce a single environmental effect, one EIR should be pre-
pared for the whole project.
The defendants also asserted that preparing an EIR was
an idle act, since a LAFCO has no power to impose conditions
regulating land use upon the annexation approval44 and thus
cannot deal with a local agency's various plans for later devel-
opment. The court stated that consideration of an EIR by the
LAFCO as a regional agency is still important, since it serves
to inform the general public of the project's potential impact
on the environment. 45
The defendants' final argument was that the city of Ca-
marillo, not the Ventura County LAFCO, was the lead agency
involved." A "lead agency" is defined in CEQA as the agency
which has the principal responsibility for carrying out or ap-
proving projects which may have a significant effect on the
environment 4 and so is responsible for preparing the EIR.5 The
court noted that the Guidelines define a lead agency as the
qualifying public agency which acts first.4" Since LAFCO was
the first agency to act on the Bell Ranch annexation, the court
found that in this instance the Ventura County LAFCO was
the lead agency. 0
41. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15142 (1975).
42. 13 Cal. 3d at 283-84, 529 P.2d at 1030-31, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 262-63.
43. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15069 (1975).
44. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 45790(a)(3) (West Supp. 1974).
45. 13 Cal. 3d at 284-85, 529 P.2d at 1031-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64 (1975),
citing Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water Dist., 27 Cal.
App. 3d 695, 704-05, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197, 202 (1972).
46. Id. at 285, 529 P.2d at 1032, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
47. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21067 (West Supp. 1974).
48. Id. § 21165.
49. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15065(c) (1975).
50. 13 Cal. 3d at 285-86, 529 P.2d at 1033, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (1975).
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In summary, the Bozung court utilized the language of
CEQA and of the Guidelines to find that LAFCOs are local
governmental agenices; that an annexation approval involving
land that is to be developed is a project having a significant
effect on the environment and thus within the coverage of
CEQA; that LAFCOs, as regional agencies, are in a better posi-
tion to prepare EIRs on annexation proposals than are the local
agencies requesting the LAFCO approval; and that in such
projects the LAFCO is the lead agency.5
The response by LAFCOs and other agencies interpreting
the Bozung decision indicates that the court's straightforward
reading of the statutory language may have a profound effect
on the operation of LAFCOs and perhaps ultimately on the
process of urban development in California.52 Although the
Knox-Nisbet Act requires that LAFCOs consider environmen-
tal factors in making decisions," there is no detailed procedure
specified. The Knox-Nisbet Act does state that LAFCOs must
initiate and make studies of existing governmental agencies,54
but these studies need not be filed with the county, nor are they
51. The legislature reacted almost immediately to the Bozung decision by
amending CEQA on July 4, 1975, to specify that LAFCOs are local agencies (as op-
posed to state agencies) for the purposes of CEQA. Cal. Stats. (1975), ch. 222. This
act amended section 21062 of the Public Resources Code and added sections 21175 and
21176. LAFCOs must now file their EIRs with the county clerk rather than with the
Secretary of Resources, as is required of state agencies.
In an analysis of the bill proposing the amendment, Cal. A.B. 335 (1975-76), by
the Assembly Committee on Resources and Land Use, it was noted that since a LAFCO
is a local agency, the LAFCO EIRs would receive only local government notice and
review: "Because LAFCO actions determine city limits, special districts' boundaries
and their formation, it is clear that they strongly influence zoning and land use and,
in general, have a great ultimate effect on local environmental quality." Unkel, Bill
Analysis, A.B. 335, Assembly Committee on Resources and Land Use 4 (1975) (mimeo)
(on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.). This amendment validates any LAFCO approvals
before February 7, 1975, and allows an extension to the continuance of a governmental
reorganization for as long as necessary to complete the requirements of CEQA.
52. See, e.g., a recent comment by the executive director of the Ventura County
LAFCO (the defendant in Bozung):
[Tihe ramifications of the Bozung decision are still being discovered. In
my opinion, the primary effect will be to relate LAFCO decisions much
more closely with land use considerations. Impacts will deal with the
depth and detail of information which is presented to LAFCO to assist
in the decision-making process. . . . Of special interest may be the im-
pact of the decision on day-to-day LAFCO activities and the manner in
which our relationships appear to be changing with local cities and spe-
cial districts.
Letter from Robert L. Braitman, Executive Officer of Ventura County LAFCO, to
Bonnie Packer, August 21, 1975 (on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.).
53. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 54774, 54796 (West Supp. 1974).
54. Id. § 54774.
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necessarily geared to any particular project. The requirement
that a LAFCO file an EIR with the county on any project that
will have a significant effect on the environment will formalize
LAFCO procedures and increase the importance of the com-
mission in county and city affairs. 55
The Bozung decision will affect the bulk of LAFCO activi-
ties. Recent studies show that most of the proposals submitted
to LAFCO are requests for annexation approvals, the majority
of which are granted.56 However, the Bozung decision may
modify that situation. LAFCOs have no authority to regulate
land use directly,57 but it has been held that agencies making
decisions on projects may not ignore potentially adverse envi-
ronmental consequences revealed by the project EIR.55 Since
LAFCOs are now required to prepare and consider an EIR on
all annexation proposals, that rule will presumably affect the
decision-making process. In addition, there appears to be an
increasing trend for some LAFCOs to impose conditions upon
annexation approvals (other than conditions which directly af-
fect land use), indicating that LAFCOs can play more of a
policing role than originally anticipated.59 It is too early to eval-
uate the effect the CEQA requirements will have on this trend,
but there is no doubt that a detailed EIR can provide a more
concrete basis upon which LAFCOs can base their conditioned
approvals.'"
The Bozung court left some issues unresolved, however. It
did not clearly delineate the situations in which a LAFCO
should be considered a lead agency. Bozung held that the Ven-
55. A detailed analysis of the response of the 57 California LAFCOs is beyond
the scope of this note and probably premature at this time. A survey conducted by
the Office of Planning and Research in December, 1974 (the Bozung decision by the
court of appeal was handed down in March, 1974) indicates that 29 of the 46 LAFCOs
which answered the survey had already adopted procedures for EIR preparation. Most
of the other LAFCOs said that such procedures were in the process of being developed.
Office of Planning and Research, A Report on Local Agency Formation Commissions
24, Sept., 1975 (draft) (on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.) [hereinafter cited as OPRI.
56. LEGATES, supra note 7, at 37, 41; OPR, supra note 55, at 19.
57. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 45790(a)(3) (West Supp. 1974).
58. Burger v. County of Mendocino, 45 Cal. App. 3d 322, 119 Cal. Rptr. 568
(1975), held that the board of supervisors did not proceed in the manner required by
law when it ignored the adverse environmental effects outlined in the EIR in making
a subdivision approval.
59. LEGATES, supra note 7, at 42; OPR, supra note 55, at 23.
60. But see OPR, supra note 55, at 25. Most LAFCOs use the EIR as "one of
many factors considered in deliberations on a proposal. Rarely is the report used to
condition approvals or to deny proposals. An EIR is generally not a controlling factor
in LAFCO decisions." Id.
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tura County LAFCO was the lead agency in that particular
instance since it was the first agency to act on the project. The
"act-first" language in the Guidelines relied on by the court
appears in a section which applies only to projects to be carried
out by a non-governmental entity." Therefore, the "act-first"
criterion is not necessarily applicable when the entity request-
ing approval from a LAFCO is a city."2 The court does not make
clear why the city should not be required to prepare an EIR at
the request of the LAFCO. 3 There are also other criteria which
could be used to determine which is the lead agency, such as
the capacity and resources of the entities involved, or the
agency which will actually carry out the activity. 4
However, if a LAFCO is not designated the lead agency in
annexation approvals and is therefore not the agency which
prepares the EIR, then the benefit of LAFCO's unique exper-
tise in regional matters which the Bozung court found to be so
important on the EIR issue, may be lost." It is to be hoped that
the Guidelines will be amended to clarify when and how the
lead agency principle should be applied.
Another question not settled by the Bozung court is
whether CEQA applies to LAFCOs' sphere of influence deter-
minations. Sphere of influence plans for local agencies are
tentative 8 and analogous to the general plans of cities and
counties. 9 The Guidelines specify that general plans require
EIRs, 0 and in light of Bozung it is logical for a LAFCO to
61. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15065(c) (1975).
62. See id. (a). This is the position presently taken by the Office of Planning and
Research. Letter from Preble Stolz, Director of Office of Planning and Research, to
David Dorfman, Executive Director of Sonoma County LAFCO, April 10, 1975 (on file
at SANTA CLARA L. REV.) [hereinafter cited as Stolz].
63. See Resources Agency of California, Bozung v. LAFCO of Ventura County
in CALIFORNIA EIR MONITOR 4-5 (April 8, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Resources
Agency].
64. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15065.5(a) (1975). The Office of Planning and
Research found that in general the LAFCO was the lead agency and responsible for
preparing impact reports on proposals from citizen's groups. However, on proposals
from governmental agencies, the proposing agency was the lead agency and thus re-
sponsible for EIRs. OPR, supra note 55, at 24-25. This reflects the Guidelines criteria
for determining which is the lead agency, rather than the Bozung "act-first" test.
65. 13 Cal. 3d at 283, 529 P.2d at 1030-31, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 262-63 (1975); CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15142 (1975).
66. See, e.g., Stolz, supra note 62.
67. Seneker, supra note 20, at 168-73, explains the logic of the applicability of
CEQA to sphere of influence determinations.
68. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 54774.1, 54774.2 (West Supp. 1974).
69. Seneker, supra note 20, at 169-73.
70. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15037(a)(1) (1975).
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presume that an EIR would be required for sphere of influence
determinations as well.7 '
Land use planning in California operates on a principle of
local autonomy rather than on a regional basis.72 Commenta-
tors have suggested that LAFCOs function-as regional commis-
sions with regard to land use planning within a county7 -a
71. In a survey conducted by the San Mateo County LAFCO, 53 LAFCOs were
asked if they thought that sphere of influence determinations require an EIR. Nine
answered in the affirmative. However, the answers to whether an EIR would be
necessary for sphere of influence determinations were more complex. Ten said posi-
tively yes; 22 said no; but 15 indicated that EIRs would be necessary depending on
the particular situation. San Mateo County LAFCO Survey on LAFCOs, Jan., 1975
(on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.). Thus, it appears that 25 LAFCOs see CEQA as
applying not only to annexation procedures, as a narrow reading of Bozung would
indicate, but that it could apply to sphere of influence determinations as well.
San Diego County LAFCO, one of the more innovative commissions, has insti-
tuted a procedure whereby it combines the EIR with the sphere of influence study and
produces a single document designed for multiple applications. This document is
known as the Master EIR. Each subsequent proposal is tested against the Master EIR
for conformance or nonconformance. As the Master EIR includes a system for updating
its data, no new EIR is prepared for later projects. Thus, the Master EIR serves as the
basic environmental review for LAFCO decisions and could also be used by a city or
special district in drafting proposals to LAFCO. Memorandum from Michael Nieder-
man, Environmental Management Coordinator of San Diego County LAFCO, to Cities
Advisory Committee, April 2, 1975 (on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.). The San Diego
LAFCO finds support for the Master EIR approach in Bozung: "[Tihere is nothing
that prevents the local agency, in an appropriate case, from using the EIR prepared
by LAFCO, suitably supplemented, as the basis for its decision-making process." Id.,
citing Bozung v. LAFCO of Ventura County, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 286, 529 P.2d 1017, 1033,
118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 265 (1975).
The Santa Clara County LAFCO is also developing a Master EIR process in
relation to its urban service areas. Broderson, CEQA and the Control of Urban Sprawl
in Santa Clara County, California 71-97 (June, 1975) (Rep. EEP-51, Stanford Univer-
sity) (on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.).
72. See Marks & Tabor, Prospects for Regional Planning in California, 4 PAC.
L.J. 117 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Marks & Tabor]; Perry, The Local "General
Plan" in California, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1971); Seneker, supra note 20, at 183-84.
73. LEGATES, supra note 7, at 106-07, indicates that the planning function of
LAFCOs is important but could be enhanced by the development of more meaningful
standards and by the creation of a separate governmental services master plan for each
county. "LAFCOs have obtained a slippery hold on general planning for the county
as a region." Goldbach, Boundary Change in California: LAFCOs 50 (1970), quoted
in Marks & Tabor, supra note 72, at 118 n.3. See also OPR, supra note 55, at 2-3:
The decisions of LAFCO inherently affect the plans and future actions
of local governments. Although the commissions are specifically prohib-
ited from making decisions concerning land uses, paradoxically their de-
cisions on governmental structure and the provision of services are, never-
theless, important planning decisions. In some counties the LAFCO is
also developing a role as coordinator of planning decisions among local
governments. These are roles that were not originally contemplated for
LAFCO, but it is the only agency in a position to effectively serve these
functions for local governments.
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position that the Bozung court seems to support with its deter-
mination that LAFCOs are better qualified than other local
agencies to assess a project from both a local and regional
perspective. While prior court decisions involving CEQA dealt
with projects of individual counties, cities, or districts,74
Bozung is the first judicial determination that the legislature
intended to include regional agencies under CEQA. The Guide-
lines, with their clear regional emphasis, can now be applied
to any regional body having jurisdiction over the areas in which
a project covered by CEQA is located.75
Bonnie Packer
74. See note 16 supra.
75. See Seneker, supra note 20, at 183.
RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES-UNRUH ACT PERMITS
USE OF PREVIOUS BALANCE METHOD IN COMPUTING
FINANCE CHARGES ON REVOLVING CREDIT
ACCOUNTS-Seibert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 45 Cal. App.
3d 1, 120 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1975).
Plaintiff Hal F. Seibert maintained a revolving credit ac-
count with defendant Sears, Roebuck & Co., which he used for
occasional credit purchases paid off in monthly installments.'
To compute the finance charge for this service, the defendant
used the "previous balance" method.' Plaintiff alleged that
defendant's use of the previous balance method to compute
finance charges on its revolving credit accounts violated the
Unruh Act 3 because the monthly charge thus billed and col-
lected exceeded the "outstanding balance"' actually owed by
the plaintiff when billed.5
The Seibert case and 10 others which had originated as
class actions were consolidated for appeal on the single issue
of the legality of the previous balance method.' The California
Court of Appeal held that a retailer's use of the previous bal-
ance computation method does not violate the Unruh Act re-
quirement that all finance charges on installment or revolving
accounts be calculated on the "outstanding balance."'
Retail installment credit in California is provided for and
1. Seibert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 1, 4, 120 Cal. Rptr. 233, 237
(1975).
2. Id. at 10, 11, 13, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 241, 242, 243. There are four techniques
recognized by the retail installment credit industry by which finance charges are
calculated. (1) Previous Balance Method: charges are computed on the basis of the
closing balance of the previous billing cycle, without regard for debits for new pur-
chases or credits for payments made to the account during the current cycle. Should
the sum of such credits equal or exceed the "previous balance," however, no finance
charge is assessed at all. (2) Adjusted Balance Method: charges are computed on the
basis of the same balance, but less any credits granted during the current cycle. (3)
Ending Balance Method: charges are computed on the same balance, but current
debits and credits are both included to reflect an "adjusted" net owing, which is
subject to the charges for the current cycle. (4) Average Daily Balance Method: the
sum of the actual daily balances is divided by the number of days in the billing cycle,
the quotient used to determine the balance for computation of finance charges. Id.
3. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1801 et seq. (West 1973) [hereinafter cited as the Unruh
Acti.
4. In the ordinary sense of the term, the "outstanding balance" of any account
is a net total shown to be owed when debits and credits in the account are compared.
45 Cal. App. 3d at 16, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
5. Id. at 13, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
6. Id. at 14, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
7. Id. at 18, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
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regulated by the Unruh Act. Installment purchase agreements
are of two types: the "closed-end" contract, and the "revolving
credit" account.8 Revolving credit accounts, first offered by
most major California retailers in the 1950's,9 have largely re-
placed the closed-end contract in this state because of their
convenience. 0 The Seibert case involved the legality of a par-
ticular method of "finance charge" computation in the revolv-
ing credit scheme." Because the previous balance method has
been the one predominantly used by stores since revolving
credit was first established in California retail trade," the ques-
tion of its legality is of considerable significance.
The Seibert court began its analysis by examining the var-
ious ways in which finance charges are computed in revolving
credit arrangements. The court then considered the legislative
history of the Unruh Act and the language of the Act itself,
concluding that it was the intent of the legislature to allow use
of the previous balance method in computing finance charges
on revolving credit accounts. 3
Upon opening a revolving credit account, the customer
enters into a sequence of billing cycles 4 and receives state-
8. Id. at 10, 11,120 Cal. Rptr. at 241, 242. Retail installment credit arrangements
are of three types. (1) The "closed-end" contract, where the seller and buyer make an
agreement at the time of purchase. Terms of sale are then established with amount
and number of payments and a precomputed finance charge. Id. at 7, 120 Cal. Rptr.
at 238. (2) The "revolving credit" account, which is established by a single instrument,
providing for credit purchases without the necessity of forming a new agreement for
each purchase. A certain minimum monthly payment is contracted for, but the finance
charges are not precomputed as in the closed-end contract. Instead, the finance
charges are calculated on the basis of the net indebtedness at the end of the accounting
period. The finance charge may be avoided completely by making payment equal to
or in excess of the indebtedness which is subject to such charges. Id. at 18, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 238. (3) The 30-day account, which is an agreement by which the entire net
indebtedness is repaid within 30 days and is not, as such, an installment sale subject
to the Unruh Act. Id. at 19, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 240. But to the extent the buyer fails to
repay the net owing, the seller generally treats the account as a revolving account, and
it then becomes subject to regulation according to the provisions of the Act. Id.
9. Id. at 8, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
10. Id.
11. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1802.10 (West 1973) provides in pertinent part:
"'[Flinance charge' means the amount . . . which the retail buyer contracts to pay
or pays for the privilege of purchasing goods or services to be paid for by the buyer in
installments."
12. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 11, 12, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
13. Id. at 18, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
14. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1802.17 (West 1973) defines the "billing cycle" as the time
interval between regular monthly billing statement dates. A "billing cycle" need not
be a named calendar month: in common practice, a given "cycle" will run from any
date in one month to the corresponding date in the next one.
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ments at the close of each, as required by section 1810.3 of the
Act. 5 The customer ordinarily makes periodic payments on his
account at the agreed minimum rate, or in excess of that rate
if he chooses.' 6 Purchases made during the cycle are debited to
the account. 7 In compliance with section 1810.3 of the Unruh
Act, the statement covering the cycle will show debits incurred
and credits given during that cycle, as well as a net indebted-
ness which will be reflected as a net closing balance.'"
Since the "closing balance" is also the "opening balance"
of the following cycle, the statement received at the end of the
next or "current" cycle will designate such balance as the "pre-
vious balance." This intercyclical progression of balances, to-
gether with continuing account activity during the "current"
cycle, makes possible several different closing balances upon
which the finance charge may be calculated."9
Three methods are in common use in California to com-
pute finance charges on revolving accounts.2 0 In each case, an
account balance is determined at the end of the billing cycle.
The methods differ only as to when the "closing balance" is
computed and how it is used. The Seibert court held that the
previous balance method is not fundamentally inequitable; al-
though it was found to produce a higher aggregate finance
charge than the adjusted balance method, it also produced a
lower aggregate finance charge than either the ending balance
method or the average daily balance method.' Consequently,
the court narrowed the issue. Since the variable in the three
methods is the time at which the finance charge is computed
and billed, the court concluded that this "disparity of timing
. . . raises the question whether the Unruh Act requires the
'balance' [which will be used as the basis for the finance
charge] . . . to be struck at any particular point in time."
The court determined that the time the closing balance is
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1810.3 (West 1973) provides in pertinent part: "[Tihe
seller of any retail installment account shall mail or deliver to the buyer . . . a state-
ment . . . which the buyer may retain .... "
16. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 9, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 10, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
19. Id.
20. The methods in predominant use in California are the (a) ending balance
method, (b) previous balance method, and (c) adjusted balance method. Id. at 11, 12,
120 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
21. Id. at 12 n.15, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 242 n.15.
22. Id. at 16, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
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to be struck depends upon the construction of section 1802.10,
which requires that the finance charge be "computed on the
outstanding balance from month to month."23 Plaintiff argued
that "from month to month" modified "outstanding balance,"
and that the basis for the computation of finance charges was
the "outstanding balance from month to month."24 Thus, Sei-
bert contended, the closing balance, upon which the finance
charges are assessed, must be reduced by the amount of the
credits granted in the current cycle.25 Noting that "outstanding
balances" can be measured only with reference to a particular
point in time (that is, when the balance is struck), the Seibert
court concluded that under the three methods of computing
finance charges commonly used in California, this balance may
be struck at the beginning or the end of a cycle, or be subject
to daily adjustments for subsequent credits.2" There is nothing
in the term "outstanding balance" that requires the balance to
be struck at one particular point in time rather than another.27
In addition, the court held that the words "from month to
month" modify the verb "computed," not the term "outstand-
ing balances." 8 Construed this way, the Unruh Act requires
only that the finance charges be calculated on a balance shown
to be "outstanding" when struck at consistent monthly inter-
vals-a procedure with which the previous balance method is
consistent.
In Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co.,"5 cited by the Seibert
court, the New York Court of Appeals found that much of the
difficulty surrounding the previous balance method stems from
the fact that, while the outstanding balance is a true "out-
standing indebtedness" when struck, the finance charge com-
puted on this balance is deferred for one entire cycle.' Ac-
knowledging that payment of all but a small portion of the
balance in the succeeding ("current") cycle may result in
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 31 N.Y.2d 443, 293 N.E.2d 80 (1972). This case was also a consolidated class
action dealing with the legality of the previous balance method of computing finance
charges on revolving credit accounts. In reaching its decision, the Zachary court cited
the trial court in Seibert, 31 N.Y.2d at 456, 293 N.E.2d at 87, and the appellate court
in Seibert cited Zachary. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 17, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
30. 31 N.Y.2d at 452; 293 N.E.2d at 85.
31. Id.
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seemingly excessive finance charges, the Zachary court noted
that the customer has between 30 and 59 days in which to avoid
the finance charge altogether, depending upon the date of pur-
chase.3"
The New York court in Zachary found, therefore, that the
previous balance method made "sound business sense."33 Con-
sumers enjoy at least one monthly billing cycle to avoid the
finance charge without worrying about inflating that charge by
current purchases. The retailer is free to disregard partial pay-
ments made during the current cycle-his quid pro quo for
exempting current purchases-and can compute the finance
charge on the basis of the previous balance. 4
The dissent in Zachary, emphasizing the implication of
the words "outstanding balance," felt that the words meant the
net total of all current debits and credits in the account.35 This
reasoning, used by the plaintiff in Seibert, is illusory. The fact
is that the "outstanding balance," as it is used in the previous
balance method, is the net total of all debits and credits as of
the date it is struck. Thus the finance charge billed to the
customer is computed on the net amount actually owed and
subject to the agreement respecting installment payments on
that date.37
Another source of confusion is the inherent ambiguity of
the term "finance charge" as used in the Unruh Act. It is not,
as the name would suggest, the equivalent of interest on a loan.
32. Id. Avoidance of the finance charge is accomplished by full payment of the
"previous balance." A purchase made a day after a balance is struck will not be
included in the "outstanding balance" until the next balance is struck, 29 days hence.
In any event, the buyer has another 30 days to avoid the charge by full payment of
the "previous balance." Thus, it is possible to obtain credit services for as long as 59
days, and always for at least 30 days, without incurring a finance charge.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 31 N.Y.2d at 462, 293 N.E.2d at 91.
36. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division decision
striking down the previous balance method in favor of exclusive use of the adjusted
balance method, noting:
As the term implies, under the adjusted balance method, finance charges
are computed upon an amount which is an adjustment to the outstanding
indebtedness in the account at the close of the billing period-payments
and credits made during the current billing cycle are deducted, but pur-
chases are not added. In any month, therefore, where purchases are
made, the adjusted balance does not reflect all amounts owed at the time
that balance is struck; it is not an outstanding indebtedness.
31 N.Y.2d at 461 n.7, 293 N.E.2d at 90 n.7.
37. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 15, 16, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 244, 245.
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The Zachary court, facing the same definitional problem with
a statute of nearly identical wording, noted:
Unlike interest charges, which are assessed for the "loan
or forbearance of any money," service charges on retail
credit sales are generally defined as charges "for the privi-
lege of purchasing on credit," expressed as a time-price
differential .
A very similar definition is codified in section 1802.10 of the
Unruh Act, which designates as a finance charge any fee im-
posed by the seller for the privilege of using installment pay-
ments. 9 The fact that a buyer is billed for a fee computed on
the amount owing at the end of the previous cycle is not incon-
sistent with the Act.40 The closing balance merely reflects the
extent to which the buyer has chosen to utilize the installment
credit service offered by the seller.
The basis of the plaintiff's complaint in Seibert was that
it is unfair to charge a fee for the use of money or credit when
it is in fact not owing at the time the fee is billed.41 This argu-
ment confuses the definition of the term "finance charge." A
customer is not compelled to make use of installment pay-
ments. The buyer may, during the current cycle, make pay-
ments equal to or in excess of the "previous balance," in which
case the finance charges are excused entirely. The customer has
declined to avail himself of the privilege of making installment
payments."
If the purchaser chooses, however, to accept the available
installment credit, use of the previous balance method can
result in a finance charge which is greater than the balance
owing when billed. 3 To determine if such an apparently anom-
alous result was contemplated by the legislature, the Seibert
court turned to the legislative history of the Unruh Act. The
court noted that legislative studies which had preceeded its
enactment 4 indicated that the legislature as a body was aware
38. 31 N.Y.2d at 457, 293 N.E.2d at 88.
39. See note 11 supra.
40. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 17, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
41. Id. at 12, 13, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
42. Id. at 15, 16, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 244, 245.
43. Id. at 12, 13, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
44. Id. at 17, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 246. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Lending and Fiscal Agencies of the Assembly Interim Committee on Finance and
Insurance, 10 ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. R. No. 19 (1957-59).
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that the previous balance method was in common use. 5 The
court concluded, therefore, that the language of section 1810.2
of the Act, drafted with full knowledge of the prevailing use of
the previous balance method, must be construed as descriptive
only, and consequently not prohibitive of the previous balance
method."
In later hearings on a 1963 bill designed to ban use of the
previous balance method, a legislative committee considering
revisions of the Unruh Act decided that because complaints
about the method were infrequent and involved small
amounts, consumer protection would best be served by forcing
the seller to disclose the method used, not by changing the law
to require the use of one method to the exclusion of another. 7
It is clear from the history of the Unruh Act that the legis-
lature has been satisfied with the previous balance method of
calculating finance charges on revolving credit accounts, or at
least has chosen not to prohibit its use. The Seibert court con-
cluded that on the basis of this evidence the Act did permit the
use of the previous balance method in the retail installment
trade .
45. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 18, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 18, 19, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 247. A bill designed to prohibit use of the
previous balance method has been introduced in every Assembly session from 1963 to
1972 and has been defeated each time. Id.
48. Id. at 17, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 247. For a recent case holding the previous balance
method inconsistent with legislative intent, see Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 98,532 (3d Cir., Sept. 25, 1975), where the court emphasized
the specific language of the Pennsylvania Sales Act:
Under the disclosure provisions, a statement must be sent to the buyer
"as of the end of each monthly period." This statement must disclose (a)
the balance due at the beginning of the monthly period, (b) the amount
of purchases during the month, (c) payments and credits on behalf of the
buyer during the monthly period, and (d) the amount of the service
charge computed on the "unpaid balance." Although this sequence ...
need not be followed in the statement, we believe the order in which the
items appear in the statute is indicative of the meaning attributed to
them by the legislature. . . . What the legislature seems to have in-
tended is a computation which takes the beginning balance, adds pur-
chases, subtracts payments and other credits, then arrives at the "unpaid
balance" "as of the end of [the] monthly period." The service charge is
calculated on the basis of this "unpaid balance." We believe the disclo-
sure section of the Sales Act . . . is inconsistent with the use of the
previous balance method.
Id., at 87,998. The court also noted that "[diefendants rely . . . particularly upon
Seibert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., which interprets the California . . . Unruh Act. The
California statute, however, is quite different from the Pennsylvania Sales Act." Id.,
at 87,999 (emphasis added).
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This conclusion is supported by the language in other pro-
visions of the Act. For instance, section 1810.1 requires the
retailer to disclose "[tihe method of determining the balance
upon which a finance charge may be imposed." The language
of the section clearly indicates that alternative methods of cal-
culation are contemplated. 9
An important implication of the Seibert decision is that
California, like New York in Zachary, is not prepared to further
the cause of a limited class of consumers at the expense of all
consumers. The previous balance method sometimes produces
greater charges than the adjusted balance method. But it also
produces lower charges than either the ending balance or the
average balance methods.5" It is noteworthy that the previous
balance method occupies a middle-ground: its use is consis-
tently advantageous to neither buyer nor seller. To the extent
that the buyer carries a large credit balance, the seller is fa-
vored; but to the extent the buyer repays his previous balance,
he benefits.
Furthermore, the facts of commercial life suggest that the
Seibert court's decision to sanction the previous balance
method will prove more beneficial for consumers than a deci-
sion requiring the use of the adjusted balance method exclu-
sively. The revenues generated by credit sales are not in the
form of cash but of accounts receivable. 5 Deferred revenues are
obviously not available to cover the seller's costs of doing busi-
ness. The seller must therefore obtain financing in order to
maintain adequate inventories and pay his current operating
expenses. Since his needs will vary with the volume of credit
sales and the repayment habits of his customers, the retailer
often obtains convenient short-term financing by selling, or
discounting, his receivables to banks or specialized sales fi-
nance companies.52 If use of the adjusted balance method were
49. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 248. The court noted:
A pervasive theme in the . . . plaintiff's briefs is that the Unruh Act must
be liberally construed in favor of the consumers it is designed to protect;
and this rule requires us to construe the Act as permitting the adjusted
balance method only, to the exclusion of all others, because that method
produces the lowest consumer cost.
Id.
50. Id. at 12 n.15, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 242 n.15.
51. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (4th rev. ed. 1968). Defines "accounts receivable"
as "contract obligations owing to a person on open account; installment balances."
52. P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS & G. DONALDSON, BASIC BUSINESS FINANCE 273-76 (4th
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as HUNT].
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required, the average retail seller would face significant prob-
lems beyond the mere fact of collecting less finance charge
revenue.
First, the outstanding balance upon which the service
charge is computed would be subject to constant downward
adjustment as the customer made subsequent part payments.
Thus the amount of the seller's receivables from revolving
credit sales would be uncertain, making it virtually impossible
for him to obtain vital financing by discounting those accounts
receivable. This would seriously impair the seller's day-to-day
operations and force him to employ alternate and more costly
sources of financing.
In addition, the increased bookkeeping required with a
mandatory adjusted balance method would conceivably raise
the seller's credit costs dramatically.13 When added to higher
financing costs and/or the costs of carrying his own credit, over-
all financing costs to the seller clearly would skyrocket. At the
same time, the revenue derived from finance charges would
decrease." The commercial community, with an eye on rising
costs, would probably choose to increase prices rather than tolimit the availability of credit;5" and price increases would beimposed on cash buyers as well as users of installment credit.
To the extent that such increases would result from an attempt
to benefit users of installment credit, they would work an ineq-
uity on the cash buyer. Thus the Seibert court, by finding the
previous balance method of computing finance charges on re-
volving credit accounts permissible, refused to favor the users
of revolving credit at the expense of consumers as a whole.
Rejecting Seibert's assertion that barring the previous balance
method would produce consumer benefits,"8 the court noted
that the plaintiff "propose[s] to win a battle but . ..could
very well lose the war."57
The Seibert decision recognizes that where the legislative
intent is found to be consistent with its provisions, the Unruh
53. HUNT, supra note 52, at 50.
54. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 248. By holding the previous balance
method inequitable, the Seibert court would have made use of the adjusted balance
method mandatory; that method, by deducting current credits from the balance sub-ject to finance charges, would produce the lowest aggregate finance charge revenues
to the seller.
55. HUNT, supra note 52, at 58.
56. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
57. Id.
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Act will be strictly construed. The mere fact that one method
of computing finance charges produces higher charges than
another method is not enough to cause the court to intervene
in the function of the legislature, absent a clear showing of
unfairness to consumers as a whole.
Thomas Edward Jensen
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-WEAPONS
SEARCH INCIDENT TO CITABLE ARREST IS JUSTIFIED
IF REASONABLE NEED TO PROTECT ARRESTING OF-
FICER EXISTS-FULL SEARCH REQUIRES INDEPEN-
DENT JUSTIFICATION-People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d
528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
On the night of June 3, 1970, two deputy sheriffs arrested
Michael Brisendine and three companions for having an illegal
open campfire in a section of the San Bernadino National For-
est that had been designated a "high fire hazard area."' Before
escorting the youths out of the restricted area, the deputies
conducted a weapons search of each suspect's person and ef-
fects.' One officer searched inside Brisendine's knapsack after
determining that its outer layer was too solid to permit him to
ascertain whether the interior contained weapons.' The search
of the knapsack yielded a quantity of marijuana within an
opaque plastic bottle as well as a number of tablets wrapped
in tinfoil and enclosed in envelopes.'
Brisendine was charged with possession of marijuana' and
possession of a restricted dangerous drug.' A motion to sup-
press the evidence as the product of an illegal search and sei-
zure was denied.7 After an unsuccessful petition for a writ of
mandamus, Brisendine's case was submitted to the trial court
on the transcript of the preliminary hearing.' He was found
guilty on both counts and placed on probation. The case
reached the California Supreme Court on appeal from the order
granting probation.'"
The supreme court agreed with the trial court that the
search of both Brisendine and his knapsack had been justified
by a need to protect the arresting officers from possible attack
during the prolonged close contact with the suspects." How-
l. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 533, 531 P.2d 1099, 1101, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315, 317 (1975).
2. Id. at 533, 531 P.2d at 1101-02, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 317-18.
3. Id. at 533, 531 P.2d at 1102, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
4. Id.
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 1975).
6. Id. § 11377.
7. 13 Cal. 3d at 532, 531 P.2d at 1101, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see CAL. PEN. CODE § 1237 (West 1970).
11. 13 Cal. 3d at 538, 541, 531 P.2d at 1105, 1107, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 321, 323.
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ever, the supreme court concluded that the officers had ex-
ceeded the permissible scope of the search by examining the
contents of the bottle and the envelopes, neither of which could
reasonably have contained weapons,12 The court found that the
illegally seized evidence had improperly been admitted, and
reversed. 3
In reaching this result, the Brisendine court rejected as not
dispositive the United States Supreme Court decision, United
States v. Robinson.'4 In Robinson, the Supreme Court held that
under the fourth amendment a custodial traffic arrest based on
probable cause provided in and of itself a sufficient justifica-
tion for a full search of the person of the arrestee without a
warrant' 5-an interpretation the California court had pre-
viously rejected. Basing its decision on the "more exacting"
standard of the California Constitution, the Brisendine court
reaffirmed California's prior rule on searches -incident to a
traffic arrest," and further determined that the rationale of the
12. Id. at 544-45, 531 P.2d at 1109-10, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 325-26.
13. Id. at 545, 531 P.2d at 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
14. 414 U.S. 218 (1973); see People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 545, 531 P.2d
1099, 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326 (1975). The Brisendine court also rejected Gustafson
v. Florida, 414 U.S. 206 (1973), a decision which was argued together with Robinson.
"For the purposes of our discussion there do not appear to be significant distinctions
between the two cases, and accordingly references to Robinson should be taken to
apply to Gustason also." People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 546 n.13, 531 P.2d 1099,
1110 n.13, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326 n.13 (1975).
15. 414 U.S. at 235. The California court noted that the United States Supreme
Court never defined the term "custodial arrest" in the Robinson opinion. 13 Cal. 3d
at 546 n.14, 531 P.2d at 1110 n.14, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326 n.14. The only indication of
the term's meaning is found in a footnote in which the court quoted a policeman's
testimony that a full custodial arrest is one where an officer "would arrest a subject
and subsequently transport him to a police facility for booking." United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 221 n.2 (1973). The opinion failed to reveal whether the arrest must
be one requiring that the defendant be booked before it is considered a full custodial
arrest. Neither did it indicate whether Robinson was himself booked. 13 Cal. 3d at 546
n.14, 531 P.2d at 1110 n.14, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326 n.14. Within the opinion of the court
of appeals, however, there is a reference to Robinson's ability to post bond and avoid
the process of booking. Id., citing United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1102-03
(1972). Thus, the California court assumed that this option was open to him. 13 Cal.
3d at 546 n.14, 531 P.2d at 1110 n.14, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326 n.14.
16. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 546, 531 P.2d 1099, 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315, 326 (1975). The California Supreme Court has not hesitated to set higher stan-
dards under the California Constitution than those minimum standards set by the
United States Constitution in various areas of the law. See, e.g., Rios v. Cozens, 9 Cal.
3d 454, 509 P.2d 696, 107 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1973) (due process); People v. Triggs, 8 Cal.
3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973) (search and seizure); Dep't of Mental
Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965) (equal
protection); Cardenas v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr.
657 (1961) (double jeopardy); People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955)
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traffic arrest rule could properly be applied to non-traffic offen-
ses as well. The court held that if the offense for which an arrest
is made does not require booking or incarceration, a full search
or a weapons search is justified only where the arresting officer
can point to "specific and articulable facts" necessitating the
intrusion. 7
Prior to Brisendine, California law on the validity of a full
search incident to a custodial traffic arrest was uncertain."S The
California rules requiring independent justification for a full
search were established in People v. Superior Court (Kiefer),"1
and People v. Superior Court (Simon).2" If based on minimum
standards required by the California Constitution, Kiefer and
Simon remained good law;"' if based on the fourth amendment,
(search and seizure); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) (search and
seizure).
Particularly illuminating is People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded sub nom. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33(1972), opinion reinstated, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973). The United States Supreme Court remanded the Krivda
case to the California Supreme Court for a determination of whether its decision was
based on a higher standard of protection guaranteed by the California Constitution or
whether it had attempted only to reflect the United States Constitution's minimum
standards. 409 U.S. 33 (1972). The California Court concluded that it had relied on
both the California and United States Constitutions in reaching its holding, and hence
the California Constitution supplied an independent ground for a higher standard of
protection. 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973). Accordingly, the
United States Supreme Court let the decision stand. 412 U.S. 919 (1973); see Cooper
v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); 9 U.S.F.L..REV. 317 (1974).
17. 13 Cal. 3d at 545, 531 P.2d at 1109, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
18. In March, 1974, a California Court of Appeal concluded that United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), was controlling in California. People v. Norman, 112
Cal. Rptr. 43 (1974). Consequently, the court adopted the Robinson holding that a full
search is justified incident to a custodial arrest for a traffic violation. People v. Nor-
man, supra at 50.
The California Supreme Court reversed this decision, reaffirming Brisendine's
rejection of the Robinson rule. People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 939, 538 P.2d 237,
244-45, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 116-17 (1975). The supreme court held, under the California
Constitution, that weapons searches are impermissible incident to custodial traffic
offenses where the offender is transported directly to the magistrate and released
without being booked, unless there is independent probable cause to believe that
weapons are present. People v. Norman, supra at 939, 538 P.2d at 244-45, 123 Cal.
Rptr. at 115-17. However, if the arrestee must be transported in the patrol car a
weapons search is always permissible. Id.
19. 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
20. 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972).
21. Kiefer and Simon presented interpretive problems because they did not state
whether they relied on the California Constitution or the United States Constitution
for support.
On one hand, the Kiefer decision mentioned fourth amendment rights three times,
indicating that the court might have based its holding on the United States Constitu-
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the higher standards set by the California Supreme Court
would have had to yield to the Robinson rule." In rejecting
tion. Several United States Supreme Court decisions were cited, including Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 3 Cal. 3d at 813-14, 828-29, 831, 478 P.2d at 452, 463,
465, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 732, 743, 745. On the other hand, the Kiefer case also drew support
from People v. Cruz, 61 Cal. 2d 861, 395 P.2d 889, 40 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964) and People
v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528 (1955), two California cases which conceivably
could have relied on the California Constitution. 3 Cal. 3d at 813, 478 P.2d at 452, 91
Cal. Rptr. at 732 (1970). Further, in People v. Gale, 9 Cal. 3d 788, 794-95, 511 P.2d
1204, 1209, 108 Cal. Rptr. 852, 857 (1973), a 1973 auto search decision, the California
Supreme Court stated that the Kiefer opinion had been based in part on article I,
section 19, of the California Constitution.
The foundation of Simon is equally unclear. Like Kiefer, Simon discussed the
fourth amendment and relied on Supreme Court cases, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 7 Cal. 3d 186, 197 n.10, 198, 203-
06, 210, 496 P.2d 1205, 1213 n.10, 1214, 1217-22, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 845 n.10, 846, 849-
54. Another clue to Simon's basis is found in the court's discussion of People v. Graves,
263 Cal. App. 2d 719, 70 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1968). The Simon majority observed that the
Graves court had misconstrued Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), by applying it to
traffic arrest cases. People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 204, 496 P.2d 1205, 1218,
101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 850 (1972). The Simon decision applied its interpretation of Terry's
reasoning to its own fact situation, thus indicating that it was applying Terry's use of
the fourth amendment. Id. at 206, 496 P.2d at 1219-20, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52.
Again, however, the decision may also have been founded on the California Consti-
tution. The opinion drew case support from various California decisions, any of which
may have been based on the Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Mercurio, 10 Cal. App.
3d 426, 88 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1970); People v. Hana, 7 Cal. App. 3d 664, 86 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1970); People v. Figueroa, 268 Cal. App. 2d 721, 74 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1969). People v.
Superior Court (Simon), 7 Cal. 3d at 207, 496 P.2d at 1220, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 852. None
of the cases cited states that it is founded on the California Constitution, but the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr.
62 (1971), vacated and remanded sub nora. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972),
opinion reinstated, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 33 (1973), held that it had relied on the California Constitution in reaching
its conclusion despite the fact that its original opinion gave no indication that this was
the case. 8 Cal. 3d 623-24, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973). Further, the supreme
court later stated in People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 516 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408
(1973), that although it relied on both the California and the United States Constitu-
tions in reaching its decision, it referred for the sake of convenience to state and federal
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures "under the rub-
ric of 'Fourth Amendment' rights .... " Id. at 892 n.5, 506 P.2d at 237 n.5, 106 Cal.
Rptr. at 413 n.5. Consequently, it is possible that the Simon court may have relied on
the California Constitution even though the opinion only mentioned "fourth amend-
ment" rights.
22. In People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899,910, 500 P.2d 1097, 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr.
897, 904 (1972), the California Supreme Court held that Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970), obliged it to overrule an older California case, People v. McGrew, 1
Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969). The court noted that Chambers
provided constitutional interpretations contrary to the reasoning in McGrew and con-
cluded that the foundation of the McGrew opinion was thus undermined. It seemed
to concede that the McGrew opinion was based on the United States Constitution.
People v. McKinnon, supra at 910, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
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Robinson, the Brisendine court not only reaffirmed California's
rules regarding searches incident to arrest, but reexamined
their basis and scope in order to determine whether they could
rationally be applied to a citation-arrest situation.
Initially, the supreme court upheld the trial court's finding
of fact that the officer's search of Brisendine was a weapons
search and not "merely a facade . . . for an exploratory
search." 3 Consequently, the primary issue for the court to re-
solve was whether there was justification for a weapons search.
The court held that a pat-down was appropriate because the
arresting officers were required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion to travel in close proximity with the arrestees;4 the danger
to the officer reasonably warranted such a relatively minor in-
trusion.2
Having thus found that the weapons search was justified
at its inception, the court also had to determine whether the
search exceeded in intensity and scope the legitimate purpose
for which it was authorized." The court found, first, that a pat-
down search of the defendant's knapsack was authorized toinsure the protection of the officers;27 and second, that a search
of the interior of the knapsack was proper where "the pat-down
of the exterior proved insufficient to allay the fear that the
interior might contain a weapon." 8
However, the majority rejected as unauthorized the search
of a bottle and envelopes found within the knapsack: "No one
can rationally maintain that such actions were necessary for[the officers'] protection."29 To exceed a pat-down without
first discovering an object which feels reasonably like a knife,
gun, or club, the court ruled that an officer
must be able to point to specific articulable facts which
reasonably support a suspicion that the particular subject
is armed with an atypical weapon which would feel like the
object felt during the pat-down. 0
Throughout its analysis, the supreme court consistently
23. 13 Cal. 3d at 534-35, 531 P.2d at 1102, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
24. Id. at 537, 531 P.2d at 1104, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 538, 531 P.2d at 1105, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
27. Id. at 541, 531 P.2d at 1107, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
28. Id. at 543, 531 P.2d at 1108, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
29. Id. at 544, 531 P.2d at 1109, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
30. Id. at 543-44, 531 P.2d at 1108, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 324; see id. at 547-48 n.15,
531 P.2d at 1111 n.15, 119 Cal. Rptr. 327 n.15.
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treated the Brisendine fact pattern as analogous to the traffic
arrest situations of Kiefer and Simon." Thus in considering the
justifications offered for the weapons search, the majority con-
cluded that the situation resembled a traffic arrest where the
arresting officer is required to bring the offender immediately
before a magistrate." The officers in Brisendine were forced to
travel in close proximity with the suspect during the physically
demanding journey from the illegal campsite;" in Simon, the
arresting officers rode in the police car with the traffic offender
to the courthouse. In both cases, the court reasoned, it was
difficult for the arresting officers to continually watch a suspect
who might have concealed weapons in his clothing. 4 The
Simon court, skeptical of the average traffic offender's propens-
ity for violence, had concluded that a weapons search incident
to a traffic arrest was unwarranted except upon independent
probable cause.35 The Brisendine court, however, adopted Jus-
31. In Kiefer, the supreme court had noted that the historical justification for a
warrantless search incident to arrest was inappropriate when applied to a traffic cita-
tion. 3 Cal. 3d at 812, 814-15, 829, 478 P.2d at 451, 463-64, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 731, 743-
44. Historically, searches incident to arrest had been justified on the grounds that they
were needed to uncover (1) evidence or fruits of the crime, (2) contraband, or (3)
weapons which might be used to effect an escape or harm the arresting officer. Id. at
812, 478 P.2d at 451, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 731. The Kiefer court pointed out that traffic
violations produced no evidence capable of being carried on the suspect's person or in
his vehicle. Id. at 813, 478 P.2d at 451, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 731. The court also noted that
traffic offenses fail to provide the arresting officer with grounds on which to base a
suspicion that the suspect or his vehicle were concealing contraband. Id. at 814-15, 478
P.2d at 452-53, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 732-33. Similarly, the majority concluded that by
reason of the violations, the officer has no cause to suspect that a traffic violator will
be armed: traffic arrestees are peaceful the vast majority of the time. Id. at 815, 829,
478 P.2d at 453, 463-64, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 733, 743-44.
On the basis of this reasoning, the Kiefer court held that a search of the traffic
arrestee's vehicle was impermissible incident to a traffic arrest except upon indepen-
dent probable cause. Id. at 829, 478 P.2d at 464, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 744. Two years later,
the supreme court used the same reasoning in the Simon decision to disallow a full
search of an arrestee's person. People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 201-02, 205-06,
496 P.2d 1205, 1216-17, 1219, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 848-49, 851 (1972).
32. 13 Cal. 3d at 536-37, 531 P.2d at 1103-04, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20. The
Vehicle Code categories of arrest discussed in Simon include three different types of
offenders:
(1) those who are merely cited and immediately released, (2) those who
may or must be taken before a magistrate and given the option to post
bond, and (3) those who are arrested for felonies and booked according
to the general Penal Code provisions on felony arrests.
Id. at 536, 531 P.2d at 1103-04, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20 (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. at 537-38, 531 P.2d at 1104-05, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
34. Id.
35. People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d at 186, 205-06, 496 P.2d 1205, 1219, 101
Cal. Rptr. 837, 851 (1972).
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tice Wright's concurrence in Simon and held that the potential
danger to the officer during prolonged exposure to the suspect
was a valid justification for a pat-down weapons search."
The court noted that hard and fast rules for determining
the validity of a pat-down incident to a citable arrest were
inadequate and unworkable.37 The validity of each search, it
held, depends on its reasonableness, and the determination
should be made on a case by case basis, weighing the suspect's
interest in protecting his person and effects from a search
against the officer's interest in his self-protection. Searches are
reasonable only where the need to search outweighs the inva-
sion of privacy the search entails. 8
In the court's view, the same considerations that justified
the search of Brisendine's body also validated a search of his
knapsack.39 It based this conclusion on two considerations.
First, the knapsack had' to be removed from the restricted area;
second, there was no reasonable way for the officers to withhold
the pack from Brisendine during the journey." The court rea-
soned that the potential danger to the officer was the same
whether a weapon was secreted on the suspect's person or
within the belongings he was carrying. Under the circumstan-
ces, the knapsack was in effect an extension of the suspect's
person.4'
36. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 528, 537, 531 P.2d at 1099, 1104, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 320 (1975).
37. Id. at 538, 531 P.2d at 1104-05, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
38. Id., citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In concluding that the officers
acted reasonably in searching the defendant Brisendine, the court appears to have
been influenced by a number of factors: (1) the trail from the campsite leading out of
the restricted area of the forest was so narrow and primitive that travelers were forced
to use their hands in some places and occasionally could only pass by one at a time;(2) the journey back took almost two hours, much of it in darkness after the batteries
in the officers' flashlights failed; (3) the hike was so demanding that traversing some
parts of the terrain required the cooperation of all six hikers; (4) the officers had no
idea where each of the suspects were during most of the trip back because the hikers
traveled in staggered groups; (5) the suspects carried no identification and the officers
did not know anything about their background; (6) the officers did not know whether
the suspects were wanted personnel who might have used the journey from the camp-
site for an opportunity to escape; and (7) the arrest and subsequent journey occurred
very late at night. 13 Cal. 3d at 533, 535, 537 n.8, 543, 531 P.2d at 1101, 1103, 1104
n.8, 1108, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 317, 319, 320 n.8, 324.
These extreme conditions raise the possibility that only similarly extreme condi-
tions will cause a weapons search to be reasonable. However, the court also stated that
a ride in a patrol car is justification per se for a weapons search. Id. at 548 n.15, 531
P.2d at 1111 n.15, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 327 n.15.
39. 13 Cal. 3d at 540, 531 P.2d at 1106, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 540-41, 531 P.2d at 1106-07, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23. This point is also
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Since the court accepted the illegality of the campsite as
justification for requiring the knapsack to be removed,42 it
avoided having to make a definitive ruling on the possible al-
ternative of leaving the knapsack at the campsite unsearched.
There are indications in the opinion, however, that had it been
feasible, Brisendine might have been allowed to avoid the
search of the pack by agreeing to let it stay behind. The reason-
ing used throughout the case supports this position. The court's
justification for the search was limited to the need to protect
the officers.43 Because suspects have easy access to weapons
hidden in their clothing, they must be searched to eliminate
this possible danger. It follows naturally that if a suspect can-
not reach his effects in order to secure hidden weapons, there
is no potential danger to the arresting officers. Hence, there
would be no justification to search a suspect's effects.
A second indication that leaving the pack behind might
have removed justification for its search was the court's appar-
ent willingness to extend the rule developed in People v.
Miller" and Mozzetti v. Superior Court,45 two so-called "car
inventory cases." Miller and Mozzetti stand for the proposition
that the effects of an individual arrested on an outstanding
traffic warrant may be left uninventoried within his car.4" The
mentioned in Justice Burke's dissent. Id. at 558, 531 P.2d at 1118, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
334, citing People v. Belvin, 275 Cal. App. 2d 955, 958-59, 80 Cal. Rptr. 382, 384 (1969).
42. Id. at 541, 531 P.2d at 1107, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
43. Id. at 537-38, 531 P.2d at 1104-05, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
44. 7 Cal. 3d 219, 496 P.2d 1228, 101 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1972). Officers found the
defendant asleep in his car one night in an area of South San Francisco known for its
high crime rate. After conducting a radio check of his identity, they arrested him on
the basis of an outstanding traffic warrant. The officers asked Miller if they could take
certain pieces of apparently valuable electronic equipment and a coat he had in the
car into custody for "safekeeping." Miller expressly refused their request, stating that
he would rather leave the items in the car and assume the risk that they would be
stolen. Nonetheless, to prevent their theft the officers decided to take the items to the
police station. On inventorying the items seized the officers discovered marijuana in
the coat pocket. Id. at 222, 496 P.2d at 1230, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
45. 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971). The defendant was
involved in a two-car collision in Sacramento, California. After she had been taken
from the scene in an ambulance, officers determined that her car was blocking the
roadway and made arrangements to have it towed to police storage. Following standard
procedure, officers inventoried the contents of the car before it left the site of the
accident. In the process they found a small suitcase in the back seat, opened it, and
found marijuana within. Id. at 702, 484 P.2d at 85, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
46. In Mozzetti, the court dismissed the argument that the inventory search of
the articles in the car was justified by the need to protect them from theft. 4 Cal. 3d
699, 707, 484 P.2d 84, 88-89, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 416-17 (1971). The court weighed the
owner's interest in having his effects itemized and taken into custody to insure subse-
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Brisendine court could have chosen to give the Miller-Mozzetti
cases a narrow interpretation and limited their application to
car inventory cases. Instead, the court cited the cases to
counter the prosecution's argument that the pack could not
have been left at the campsite because of the danger of theft.4 7
This suggests that a search might be prohibited if circumstan-
ces were such that the arrestee's personal effects could be left
at the site of the arrest.48
The alternative possibility that officers should have been
required to withhold the pack from the suspect during the jour-
ney back without searching it was left similarly unclear. The
court concluded that there were no "ready means" of limiting
Brisendine's access to the pack." Apparently, the majority did
not believe that the officers had a duty to act as "porters" for
Brisendine's knapsack and camping gear simply to avoid hav-
ing cause to search it.5 However, if the pack could have been
withheld with only a reasonable amount of effort, the court
quent return, against his interest in maintaining his privacy. It concluded that the
invasion of privacy was not justified because items left in the car could be adequately
protected by rolling up the windows and locking the doors. 4 Cal. 3d 699, 707, 484 P.2d
84, 89, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 413. Since the decision was decided on the facts of a car
search, it seems that the court relied on the fact that a locked car provided reasonable
protection for items within it, even though occasionally items may be removed from
it.
Miller relied on the reasoning of Mozzetti. 7 Cal. 3d at 223-24, 496 P.2d at 1231,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 863. The court merely applied the Mozzetti principle to cover car
inventory searches incident to an outstanding traffic warrant as well as to the on-the-
scene inventory search of a car before it is towed away pursuant to statute. Id.
47. 13 Cal. 3d at 540-41, 531 P.2d at 1106-07, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23. The court
did not indicate that it attached significance to the strong likelihood that the arrestee's
belongings were permitted to remain uninventoried in the cars in Mozzetti and Miller
because the cars involved afforded them a reasonable amount of protection. Conse-
quently, it is not clear whether the Brisendine majority viewed those cases as standing
for that proposition, or whether they construed the cases as supporting the position
that a defendant can leave his belongings in an area where they are not protected as
long as he is willing to accept the risk of theft.
Obviously, if an arrestee's belongings are reasonably secure from theft, one has a
stronger argument that they should be left behind unsearched. This rationale is most
consistent with the reasoning of Mozzetti and Miller and would not represent a radical
break from the supreme court's previous position.
48. The court stated:
If the defendant had been camped legally and it was necessary to tempo-
rarily remove him from the area for a citation unrelated to his presence
in the forest we might well be persuaded that he could demand his effects
remain at the camp, unsearched, pending his return.
13 Cal. 3d at 541, 531 P.2d at 1107, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
49. Id. at 540, 531 P.2d at 1106, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
50. Justice Burke agreed that this is the position the majoritytook. Id. at 558,
531 P.2d at 1118, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
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conceivably might have decided that the officers' search was
unjustified.
The court reiterated, however, the permissible scope of a
search is "determined in the light of the rationale which origi-
nally justified the search";5 when the justification is the pro-
tection of the arresting officer, the search must be strictly lim-
ited to weapons.52 In this regard, the court considered the rule
stated in People v. Collins3 that any object which might rea-
sonably contain a weapon can be inspected by police officers
to determine whether a weapon is contained therein.5" Con-
versely, Collins also held that an object which could not reason-
ably contain a weapon may not be subjected to further exami-
nation.5 Accordingly, the Brisendine court found the officers'
search into the plastic bottle and envelope unwarranted, as
neither object was large enough to contain a typical weapon.5"
The supreme court also followed the Collins case in rejecting
the argument that the need to search for atypical weapons57
justifies a greater intrusion. In the court's view there was no
reason to suspect the presence of atypical weapons. Hence, the
scope of the search could not be expanded to include a search
for them, except upon independent probable cause.5" Appar-
ently, the court concluded that an extended search would con-
stitute an intrusion on the arrestee's privacy greater than the
need to protect the officer from atypical weapons.
The Brisendine decision indicates that the California Su-
preme Court has deliberately avoided adopting the United
State Supreme Court's rigid rule regarding searches incident
51. Id. at 542, 531 P.2d at 1108, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
52. Id. at 542, 531 P.2d at 1107, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
53. 1 Cal. 3d 658, 463 P.2d 402, 83 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1970).
54. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 543-44, 531 P.2d 1099, 1108-09, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 324-25 (1975).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The term "atypical weapons" is never defined in the Brisendine or the
Collins opinions. From the context of the supreme court's use of the term, however, it
appears that it refers to instrumentalities which may be used as weapons but which
would not feel like typical weapons if encountered by an officer during a pat-down.
People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 543-44, 531 P.2d 1099, 1108-09, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315, 324-25 (1975); People v. Collins, 1 Cal. 3d 658, 663, 463 P.2d 403,406, 83 Cal. Rptr.
179, 182 (1970). According to the Collins decision, an example of an atypical weapon
is razor blades concealed in a handkerchief. 1 Cal. 3d at 663, 463 P.2d at 406, 83 Cal.
Rptr. at 182. Brisendine talks about a rubber water pistol filled with acid as if it is an
atypical weapon. 13 Cal. 3d at 543, 531 P.2d at 1108, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
58. Id. at 543-44, 531 P.2d at 1108-09, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 324-25.
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to custodial arrest. 9 Whereas the United States Supreme Court
held that a full search is always permissible if incident to cus-
todial arrest, the California Supreme Court, relying on the Cal-
ifornia Constitution, continues to determine the reasonable-
ness of particular types of custodial-arrest searches in light of
the practical considerations which justify them. Where the na-
ture of the offense suggests no justification for a particular type
of search, the court appears willing to rule categorically that
such searches are unreasonable as a class. But according to
Brisendine, arrests involving unusual circumstances must be
judged individually.
Only by examining the reasonableness of searches incident
to arrest on a case-by-case basis can the court afford arrestees
the amount of protection against unreasonable searches re-
quired by the California Constitution while assuring the arrest-
ing officer of adequate protection from potential danger. Cali-
fornia's flexible approach insures that individuals arrested will
be forced to submit to a search where the circumstances of the
particular arrest warrant it.
Paul H. Miller
59. Since Brisendine was handed down, the California Supreme Court has twice
rejected Robinson. See People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951-52, 538 P.2d 753, 758,
123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (1975); People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 938-39, 538 P.2d 237,
244, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 116 (1975). In both cases, the court refused to recognize the
rigid Robinson view that a full search was justified by the fact of the arrest itself.
In Norman, the defendant was arrested for several traffic offenses. Because one of
these violations was evading arrest, the officers at their option could have brought the
defendant without booking him directly before the nearest or most accessible magis-
trate (the Simon situation). Alternatively, they could have released him after present-
ing him with a written notice to appear (a citation) and obtaining his promise that he
would do so. Id. at 943, 538 P.2d at 241, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 113. Though rejecting both
a full search and a weapons search incident to arrest, the court did hold that a ride in
the patrol car is justification per se for a weapons search. Id. at 938-39, 538 P.2d at
244-45, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 116-17; see People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 547-48 n.15,
531 P.2d 1099, 1111 n.15, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 327 n.15 (1975).
In Longwill, the defendant was the passenger in a speeding car. The vehicle's
driver was arrested for reckless driving and the defendant was arrested for being intoxi-
cated in public. The court agreed with the prosecution that preventing the introduction
of contraband into the jail facility justified a full search of the defendant if he was going
to be incarcerated. 14 Cal. 3d at 946, 538 P.2d at 755, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 299. However,
it recognized that under the procedures involved in processing a suspect for public
intoxication it was very likely that any particular arrestee would neither be booked nor
jailed. Id. at 947-48, 538 P.2d at 755-56, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300. Accordingly, the
court felt that individuals arrested for public intoxication should not be subjected to
a full search unless they were actually going to be incarcerated. Id. at 952, 538 P.2d at
758-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03.
